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Abstract 
The United States Army faced a dire challenge when conscription was phased out 
in favor of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973.  The Army was confronted with 
pressing manning requirements while suffering from the American public‟s disapproval 
over the war in Vietnam.  The end of the draft in favor of an all-volunteer force did not 
offer a great deal of promise for filling Army manpower requirements.  Army leadership 
realized that it needed new methods that could recruit quality volunteers while 
simultaneously reforming the Army‟s public image.  Paid television advertising, able to 
reach a wide and diverse viewing audience, was pursued as a way to achieve both of 
those objectives.   
This study examines Army television advertisements since the creation of the 
AVF and analyzes their imagery and messages.  Surprisingly consistent themes and 
messages have persisted in the Army‟s television advertising for over thirty-five years of 
the AVF‟s existence.  During that same time, American attitudes toward the military 
were increasingly characterized by an interesting paradox.  The American public 
overwhelmingly supported the military but grew less inclined to volunteer for military 
service.  The public‟s good feelings toward the Army and its “support for the troops” 
were not borne out with strong recruitment numbers during the years of the AVF.  This 
work will argue that the messages in Army television advertising helped change the 
Army from a vital national institution into just another employer making a basic job offer 
in the audience‟s mind while doing little to reform the Army‟s public image.  The ads did 
 not appeal to America‟s youth to commit themselves to national service.  Rather, the ads 
promised to help individuals realize their wishes and dreams by focusing on the 
economic and educational advantages that the Army could deliver.  Consequently, the ads 
cast the Army as a sort of trade school willing to provide young people with marketable 
skills, educational opportunities and enlistment bonuses in return for a short stint in the 
service.  Public service and duty to the nation were rarely mentioned.  The ads portrayed 
the Army as willing to strike deals with recruits to advance their personal goals and 
enrichment while demanding little in return.  
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction: Recruitment and Image-Building 
This study examines Army television commercials used in recruitment and public image 
enhancement in the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) era.  Examination of the ads of the period reveals 
recurring themes and messages that the Army and its advertisers hoped would shape attitudes 
and behaviors among the American people.  Army television advertisements consistently offered 
potential recruits benefits and assurances, while hardly ever making any demands on them.  
Willing to strike deals with young people, Army advertising rarely showcased the unique 
institutional values of the service or appealed to recruits‟ feelings of patriotism or civic duty.  
Although public support for the military grew beginning in the 1980s, largely due to positive 
media portrayals and vocal support from influential Americans, advertising messages never 
effectively capitalized on the sentiment, choosing instead to promise opportunities and material 
enrichment to recruits on an individual basis.  The advertisements‟ emphasis on material 
advantages and educational opportunities available through enlistment played an important role 
in turning the Army from an honored, values-based institution into an ordinary occupation in the 
public‟s view.   
In the early 1970s, the end of conscription was in sight.  Realizing that the end of the 
draft would eliminate their most reliable source of manpower, the U.S. Army decided to employ 
paid television advertising to attract potential recruits and to reform its tarnished image in the 
wake of the Vietnam War.  In the era of conscription, Army broadcast advertising had consisted 
of free public service announcements (PSAs), but the PSAs were typically ineffective due to low 
production quality and because they were usually aired at the least desirable times on the 
broadcasters‟ schedules.   
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In the early 1970s, the Army settled on two important goals for its advertising efforts: 
recruitment of volunteers and raising its public image among all Americans.  These objectives 
called for the Army‟s advertising strategy to produce messages aimed at two distinct audiences: 
potential recruits and the general public.  The Army and its advertising agency, N. W. Ayer and 
Son, judged that television advertising in prime time was the best method to reach their dual 
target audiences.  Based on careful market research, the Army and the Ayer agency developed 
themes and messages that they believed would accomplish the two goals of recruitment and 
public image-reform.  Advertising throughout the AVF era ultimately achieved only mixed 
success.  
From 1971 to 2005, Army television advertising consistently promised to provide 
occupational, educational and monetary advantages to the individual recruit while 
simultaneously downplaying the Army‟s demands for sacrifice, conformity and obedience.  
Although the production values of the commercials improved over time, their basic themes 
remained surprisingly consistent.  The ads highlighted what market research had revealed that 
American youth wanted to hear, namely, that enlistment offered attractive economic and 
educational opportunities.  Additionally, the ads assured potential recruits that their individuality 
would be preserved and respected by the Army and that signing up for a short stint of military 
service was an advantageous economic quid pro quo.  However, by stressing material and 
educational advantages, the Army left itself vulnerable to competing messages from universities 
and other employers that could offer American youth similar advantages but on better terms.  
The ads from the 1970s to 2005 put enlistment on the same level as any other job while failing to 
remind the public of the Army‟s unique and vital purpose to the nation.   
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In the era of the AVF, promises of educational, economic and occupational opportunity 
achieved varying success, depending on the availability of alternative educational and 
employment opportunities.  In robust economic times, the Army struggled to meet recruitment 
goals but met them more easily in hard times.    
Selling the Army as just another job choice to recruits did little to improve the public 
image of the Army.  In fact, it was politicians and Hollywood directors who largely shaped the 
public image of the Army in the post-Vietnam era.  Over time, as the Army and its advertisers 
increasingly focused their efforts on the goal of recruitment, the goal of image enhancement 
received less and less attention from the service itself.  Meanwhile, television shows and movies 
took the lead in recasting the public image of soldiers.  As the Army struggled in its recruitment 
effort, overall public support for the military grew from the public glorification of the military by 
the entertainment industry and influential individuals such as President Ronald Reagan.  In short, 
Army advertising focused more readily on the recruitment function of advertising and allowed 
agents outside of the service to cast its public image.  That is, Army recruitment and image-
enhancement efforts achieved distinctly different measures of success during the first thirty-five 
years of the AVF.  
Effective advertising conveys its message to a large audience and effects specific 
behavioral changes.  According to a 2003 National Research Council study, the purpose of 
advertising is to distribute information designed to influence consumer activity in the 
marketplace.  Advertising conveys information to support and promote consumer choices among 
competing brands (Hallmark greeting cards versus American Greetings) and product categories 
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(greeting cards versus phone calls).
1
  The study notes that the role of advertising in military 
recruitment “is to support military recruiters as they identify and assist those individuals who 
show an interest in military service.  Advertising messages can help stimulate the interest of the 
youth population in military service and provide information bearing on the particular Service a 
youth might select.”2  This definition of military advertising leaves out the U.S. Army‟s stated 
goal of enhancing public opinion about the Army. Such an omission is typical of published 
studies on military advertising.   
After dismal recruiting years in the late 1970s, noticeable gains in recruitments numbers 
and opinion polls expressing youth willingness to enlist in the Army appeared in the early 1980s.  
However, these trends reversed themselves shortly thereafter, and enlistment rates steadily 
worsened over time.
3
  A partial explanation for this decline was the increasing attractiveness of 
alternatives to military service.  As Paul Sackett and Anne Mavor observed, “Although surveys 
indicate public confidence in military leadership and the military as an institution, military 
service is not seen as one of the more attractive choices for young people following high 
school.”4  Rather than join the Army, American youth were more interested in finding good 
paying jobs and/or going to college.  The Youth Attitudinal Tracking Survey (YATS), conducted 
by the Defense Department from 1975 until 2000, asked respondents in 1999 why they might 
consider joining the military.  Material concerns topped the responses.  The most common single 
reason cited for enlistment by 27.1% of respondents was to pay for their education, and 12.6% 
said they would join in order to develop marketable work skills.  Another 10.9% said pay was an 
                                                 
1
 Paul Sackett and Anne Mavor, eds., Attitudes, Aptitudes and Aspirations of American Youth: Implications 
for Military Recruitment (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2003), 225. 
2
 Ibid., 226. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
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important consideration, 2.9% cited job security, and 1.9% pointed to retirement benefits.
5
  Only 
8.4% of respondents cited duty to country as a reason to join the military in 1999.
6
  Army 
advertising messages promised assistance to young people in meeting their educational and 
occupational goals, while military values such as selfless service, commitment and duty were 
downplayed. 
Over time, the declining propensity to enlist combined with an unprecedented level of 
college attendance led the armed services to compete with each other more intensely for the 
dwindling pool of prospects.  Also, advertising costs rose considerably through the 1980s and 
1990s.  The result was that the services were paying more money to recruit from a smaller pool 
of recruits.  Army advertising expenditures and recruiting bonuses increased more than threefold 
from 1993 to 2000.
7
  Army advertising during the AVF era failed to reverse declining youth 
interest in Army enlistment but never altered its basic approach in any substantial way.  
Messages promoting public service, volunteerism and the unique institutional values of the Army 
were never widely employed. 
Though the Army struggled with recruitment, its public image improved greatly from the 
1970s through 2005, due mostly to the efforts of non-military agents.  The U.S. military in 
general enjoyed greater public esteem than it had enjoyed since Vietnam, largely due to the 
messages presented by the non-military sources.  However, increased public esteem did not 
translate into a check on declining youth interest in enlisting.   
According to Andrew Bacevich, Boston University international relations professor, the 
popular support for the military during the 1980s and 1990s was hardly surprising.  He argues 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., 230. 
6
 Ibid., 231. 
7
 Ibid., 221. 
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that “Vietnam was a defining event…  Among other things, it gave rise by war‟s end to a mood 
of pervasive and seemingly permanent anti-militarism.  But Vietnam also induced a powerful 
reaction from Americans who refused to accept the war‟s apparent verdict and who viewed with 
the alarm the changes the war gave birth to or encouraged.”8  According to Bacevich, Americans 
developed a new esteem for the military as a way to come to terms with the national failure in 
Vietnam.   Part of the process of dealing with the trauma of Vietnam was that Americans bought 
into an increasingly cheerful and less realistic Hollywood-inspired vision of the military.   Army 
television advertising of the AVF era was not the primary agent in creating the new image of the 
military, but it did little to correct the rosy Hollywood images about the Army and its soldiers.  
As a result, a supportive public cheered America‟s volunteer Army even as fewer and fewer 
Americans volunteered for military service.   
The eminent military sociologist Charles C. Moskos has theorized that in the AVF era, 
the military is no longer an institution but rather a mere occupation, competing for labor in an 
increasingly competitive market.  This shift of the military from an institution to an occupation 
has consequences, according to Moskos.  He writes, “[an] institution is legitimated in terms of 
values and norms, that is, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed 
higher good” and that “[m]embers of an institution are often seen as following a calling captured 
in words like duty, honor, and country.  They are commonly viewed and regard themselves as 
being different or apart from the broader society.”9  An occupation, on the other hand, “is 
legitimated in terms of the marketplace.  Supply and demand, rather than normative 
                                                 
8
 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 34. 
9
 Charles C. Moskos, “Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces,” in Charles C. Moskos and 
Frank R. Wood, eds., The Military: More than Just a Job? (McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey‟s International 
Defense Publishers, 1988), 16. 
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considerations, are paramount.”10  The military‟s shift towards the adoption of the “philosophy 
of the marketplace,” asserts Moskos, was marked by the end of the draft and the adoption of the 
AVF.  “The selective service was premised on the notion of citizen obligation – a calling in the 
almost literal sense of being summoned by a local draft board – with concomitant low salaries 
for junior enlisted personnel.”11  With the end of the draft, the Army became just another job, 
Moskos argues.  
Army television advertisements from the 1970s to 2005 contributed significantly to this 
shift of the Army from a highly-regarded, values-based institution to an occupation.  The ads do 
not require a recruit to transcend individual self-interest: in fact, the advertising pitch primarily 
explained how enlistment could serve the individual‟s educational and employment needs.  Two 
critics of the Army‟s lack of emphasis on civic duty in favor of monetary promises in advertising 
put it thusly: “The old urgent, in-your-face World War II poster, „UNCLE SAM NEEDS YOU!‟ 
has been changed by today‟s military to read, „Uncle Sam wants to make you a job offer you 
might consider.  Got a better offer?  Okay, sorry to have bothered you.‟”12   
Noted author and professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University Eliot Cohen argued in 1985 that American 
disinterest in military service is nothing new.  He asserted that the general disinterest of 
Americans in military service had been part of American culture since the founding of the nation.  
Cohen explained that Americans are traditionally interested in military service only when they 
feel directly threatened.  He wrote, “It is regrettable but unavoidable that today, as in the past, 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., 17. 
11
 Ibid., 19. 
12
 Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer. AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America’s Upper Classes 
from the Military – And How it Hurts our Country (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 205. 
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Americans turn their attention to military service only under the shadow of its forcible 
imposition by government.  During peacetime, or at least when war is neither recent nor 
imminent, the citizen regards the study of military service as too mundane for anyone but 
experts, or as an interesting but purely hypothetical exercise in political philosophy.”13  Cohen 
pointed out that the concept of the “citizen-soldier,” a cherished American archetype, was based 
on the idea that the most effective defense of the nation rests with the citizenry who have the 
largest stake in its defense.
14
  As previously noted, Army television advertising did little during 
the first thirty-five years of the AVF to paint military service as a civic duty.    
One must consider whether more affluence and less regard for traditional views of civic 
responsibility could explain the trends of lowered propensity among youth to enlist that emerged 
in the 1980s.  Authors Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer argue that increasing American 
“rights consciousness” might have dimmed feelings of civic obligation toward military service.  
They claim that the mid-twentieth century saw the expansion of individual rights, leading to a 
rise of “rights consciousness.”15  As a consequence, Americans felt they had a right to refuse 
military service and that, for the first time in American history, “citizens in large part felt fully 
entitled to their citizenship separate from duty such as military service.”16  Roth-Douquet and 
Schaeffer suggest that American attitudes toward military service might be colored by the belief 
that the individual American has the right to define what it means to be a “citizen.”  If so, society 
cannot suggest, much less assert, that military service is a civic obligation of all able-bodied 
Americans.  Rather military service is merely a personal choice by each individual.  Therefore, 
                                                 
13
 Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1985), 16. 
14
 Ibid., 123. 
15
 Roth-Douquet, 117. 
16
 Ibid. 
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Roth-Douquet and Schaeffer conclude, “There are no national let alone universal truths, just 
individual experiences.  So the military has to be pitched as just one more personal choice.”17  
Army television advertising, then, may have contributed to such a libertarian turn of American 
society at the expense of national service. 
Much of the literature on Army advertising focuses on the calculable cost-effectiveness 
of advertising.  Existing studies are mostly limited to figuring out how spending “x” amount of 
Army advertising dollars in various ways has resulted in the recruitment of “y” number of 
soldiers over the years.  James Dertouzos and Steven Garber‟s Is Military Advertising Effective? 
An Estimation Methodology and Applications to Recruiting in the 1980s and 90s is a typical 
example of such a cost-benefit analysis.
18
  The previously mentioned National Research Council 
study and its follow-up, published in 2003 and 2004, respectively, are a more nuanced attempt to 
devise cost-effective ways of determining youth attitudes in order to craft more effective military 
advertising.
19
  These works are useful in determining how the Defense Department and the 
Department of the Army allocated funds to support their advertising efforts, but they barely 
address the content of the advertisements.  Only the 2003 National Research Council report 
mentions possible alternative themes for existing Army advertising.  Beth Bailey‟s recent article 
in The Journal of American History, “The Army in the Marketplace: Recruiting an All-Volunteer 
Force,” does an excellent job of explaining the Army‟s decision to adopt the “logic of the 
market” in its advertising efforts in the early 1970s.20  She argues that the Army skillfully used 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., 128. 
18
 James N. Dertouzos and Steven Garber, Is Military Advertising Effiective? An Estimation Methodology 
and Applications to Recruiting in the 1980s and 90s  (Santa Mondica: RAND, 2003), iii. 
19
 Sackett, vii. 
20
 Beth Bailey, “The Army in the Marketplace: Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force,” The Journal of 
American History, No. 4, Vol. 1, (Jun 2007), 47. 
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advertising in the wake of the Vietnam War to inform potential recruits about opportunities and 
adventure available in an evolving Army.  However, Bailey does not address the Army‟s 
secondary aim of improving its public image through the advertisements.  Additionally, Bailey‟s 
articles deals exclusively with print advertising in the 1970s and does not address the medium 
that the Army leadership believed would be the most effective in reaching the largest audience: 
television.  Although not specifically dealing with Army advertising, Andrew Bacevich argues in 
The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War that Americans embraced 
militarism in the era of the AVF and, as a nation, are bent on maintaining global military 
supremacy.  Bacevich‟s work explores the creation of the mythic soldier in popular culture as 
well as the paradox of high public support for the military while willingness to enlist in the 
military continues to decline.
21
  In “Advertising and the Construction of Violent White 
Masculinity,” anti-sexism activist Jackson Katz argues that military advertising links masculinity 
and force in order to attract young working-class males.  While he concedes that the ads 
“sometimes” promote educational and financial benefits, Katz asserts that what the military ads 
are really selling to working-class males is an adventurous, aggressive and violent vision of 
masculinity.
22
   An examination of the advertisements‟ content will show that Katz minimizes 
the central messages promising financial and educational advantages while overemphasizing the 
aggressiveness and violence that he sees in military advertising.  Robert K. Griffith and Bernard 
Rostker provide excellent narratives of the early years of the AVF in their respective works The 
                                                 
21
 Bacevich, 1-2. 
22
 Jackson Katz, “Advertising and the Construction of Violent White Masculinity,” in Gail Dines and Jean 
M. Humez. Gender, Race and Class in Media: A Text-Reader (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995), 136-138. 
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U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-197423 and I Want You! The Evolution 
of the All-Volunteer Force.
24
  Griffith focuses on the transition of the Army from conscription to 
volunteer enlistments and provides valuable insight into how Army leaders met the challenges of 
recruiting for the all-volunteer Army.  Rostker‟s voluminous and exquisitely detailed work traces 
the AVF‟s history over a thirty-year arc.  While Griffith and Rostker‟s works provide wonderful 
details and background information about the Army‟s transition from conscription to volunteer 
recruitment and the role that advertising played in that process, neither work looks at the content 
of the commercials of the time to discern what messages or images were directed at the target 
audiences. 
This study will examine the content of Army television ads to determine how the Army 
“packaged” itself as a “product” to two distinct groups of consumers: potential recruits and the 
general public.  By looking at the content of sample commercials from the early 1970s up to 
2005, this work will highlight recurring messages and themes presented in the ads.  Studying the 
ads themselves will demonstrate that the continual promises of economic advantages and 
educational opportunity played a central role in transforming Army service from a profession 
into just another occupation even as public support for soldiers increasingly grew.   
                                                 
23
 Robert K. Griffith, Jr., The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974 (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1997). 
24
 Bernard Rostker, I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force, (Pittsburg: RAND Corporation, 
2006). 
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CHAPTER 2 - Dealing with Recruitment and Public Image Issues  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the end of the draft became increasingly apparent, 
the U.S. Army was forced to consider methods to induce young people to enlist.  Aside from 
increasing the attractiveness of volunteering, Army leadership endeavored to educate America‟s 
young people about the opportunities available through serving.  Utilizing sophisticated research 
methods, the Army ultimately resolved to reach out to America‟s youth through paid broadcast 
advertising.  Through such advertising, the Army would be able to pose a tempting offer to 
America‟s youth, while simultaneously reforming public opinion of the institution whose 
standing had been damaged during the Vietnam War. 
Conscription during the Vietnam era hurt the public image of the U.S. Army.  The draft 
was increasingly seen by Americans as an undemocratic process that favored some classes of 
eligible young men over others.  The root of this apparent inequity was that by the late 1960s, the 
pool of draft-eligible young men in America far exceeded military requirements.  Military 
demands dictated that barely half of the men subject to the draft would serve in the military, even 
though the country was at war.
25
  Deferments were used to excuse selected young men from 
military service.  Military historian Robert K. Griffith succinctly stated, “[T]he Selective Service 
System was running out of legitimate ways to defer men from induction.  As the baby boom 
generation approached eligibility for military service, it appeared evident that increasing 
numbers of men qualified and available for induction would never be called because the military 
                                                 
25
 Cohen, 166. 
 13 
could not absorb them.”26  When only some but not all young men would get the call to duty, the 
question arose of who would serve and how would they be chosen.  As Eliot Cohen notes in 
Citizens and Soldiers, the 1960s conscription system faced a problem: “No longer, as in the 
1950s, would virtually every young man serve in the military; rather, even during a war, barely 
half of them would.”27  As Cohen aptly notes, the key problem was determining who would have 
to serve in the Vietnam.  The draft deferments of the time subjected those who lacked 
educational opportunities, namely the poor, to a greater probability of being drafted.  
Increasingly, the public called on the military and policymakers to distribute the burden more 
fairly across the socioeconomic spectrum. 
 By the end of the 1960s, the American public and policy makers increasingly regarded 
the Selective Service System as outdated, “a mistrusted institution, composed, in the popular 
mind, of fossilized and callous old men.”28  Americans in the 1960s, more sensitive to individual 
liberties because of the civil rights movement and the “war on poverty,” increasingly questioned 
the fundamental premise of conscription and began to look for an alternative.
29
   
In 1968, presidential candidate Richard Nixon proposed an all-volunteer military force.  
Nixon‟s belief in the viability of an all-volunteer military was influenced by the ideas of several 
conservative University of Chicago economists.  The most influential of them, Milton Friedman, 
argued in 1967 that the economic situation of a draft-eligible male would determine whether he 
would volunteer for the military.  According to Friedman, “When he is forced to serve, we are in 
effect imposing on him a tax in kind equal in value to the difference between what it would take 
                                                 
26
 Griffith, 10. 
27
 Cohen, 166. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid. 
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to attract him and the military pay he actually receives.”30  According to Friedman, the Defense 
Department could save money by using an all-volunteer force “because the armed forces would 
then be manned by men for whom soldiering was the best available career, and hence would 
require the lowest sums of money to induce them to serve.”31  Here is where the shift from 
compulsory service to economically motivated volunteerism had its ideological roots.
32
  For 
Friedman and others like him, rational economic choice would fill the ranks of America‟s Army.  
Nixon‟s appointment of a presidential commission to study the implementation of an all-
volunteer force committed the administration to the idea, and so Washington turned its attention 
to the practical problems and challenges of making such a system work.   
President Nixon appointed the Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force on 27 
March 1969.  Nixon charged the commission “„to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating 
conscription and moving toward an all volunteer armed force.‟”33   The commission was to 
consider the advantages and problems that the implementation of the all-volunteer format would 
have on the military and on American society as a whole.  One of the central questions was how 
the military would be able to attract a sufficient number of “quality” volunteers.  A new 
emphasis would have to be placed on recruiting methods and military advertising. 
The University of Chicago economists on the commission, including Friedman and Alan 
Greenspan, dominated the intellectual tone of the commission‟s discussions.  Their guiding 
assumption was that economic interests would motivate people to volunteer for the military.
34
  
                                                 
30
 Rostker, 48. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Bailey, 48. 
33
 Griffith, 13. 
34
 Cohen, 168. 
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Roughly 2.5 million personnel were needed to meet the military‟s manpower demands.35  The 
overarching concern of the commission was “„whether sufficient numbers of capable men could 
be attracted by voluntary means.‟”36  In short, what economic incentives could the Army and 
other services offer that would make the military an attractive career choice?  A less obvious but 
related question was, if the military could construct an attractive incentive for America‟s youth, 
what would be the best means of making this offer known?   
Presented to President Nixon on 20 February 1970, the Report of the President‟s 
Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (more commonly known that the “Gates Commission 
Report”) endorsed the AVF concept.  In his introductory letter to Nixon, former Eisenhower 
Secretary of Defense and committee chair Thomas S. Gates wrote, “We unanimously believe 
that the nation‟s interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an 
effective standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts; [and] that steps 
should be taken promptly to move in this direction.”37   
The report noted that while the shift to an all-volunteer force would result in higher initial 
costs, the costs of sustaining the AVF would be lower in the long run than for a mixed system of 
conscripts and volunteers.  Following Friedman‟s lead, the commission asserted that conscription 
served as a “tax in kind” and that it imposed a social and human cost on those inducted not 
reflected in budgetary dollars and cents.
38
  The commission asserted that conscription provided 
the services with inexperienced and untrained men, and thus savings in training costs could be 
                                                 
35
 Ibid., 167. 
36
 Ibid., 169. 
37
 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1970), i.   
38
 Ibid., 12 
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secured by recruiting and retaining career volunteers.
39
  In response to the charge that the AVF 
would create an undemocratic and unrepresentative force that could threaten American 
democracy, the commission argued that it was conscription, with its perceived inequities, that 
undermined the public‟s respect for the government and that the AVF would actually 
complement democratic practices in the services.
40
  “A force made up of men freely choosing to 
serve should enhance the dignity and prestige of the military.  Every man in uniform will be 
serving as a matter of choice rather than coercion.”41  
The Gates Commission dedicated an entire chapter of its report to recruitment methods 
for a truly all-volunteer military.  The commission noted, “An expanded and more effective 
recruiting effort will help supply an all-volunteer force with the desired quality of enlistees.”42  
Effective recruiting would require advertising campaigns to inform the target audience of the 
benefits of the new AVF.  “More advertising in mass media will be both required and rewarding 
once an all-volunteer force has been instituted, for the elimination of conscription will coincide 
with improved incentives in the military.”43  The Gates Commission also claimed that 
advertising could improve the military‟s public image.44   
The Defense Department allowed each of the services to develop its own methods for 
reaching its target audience.  As the largest of the armed forces and with the most to lose once 
conscription ended, the Army faced the biggest challenge in mitigating its potential manpower 
losses.  In the late 1960s, the Army leadership preferred conscription as a dependable source of 
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manpower and was comfortable with its use.  The end of the draft would require a “major 
undertaking that presented many uncertainties.”45   
However, reports of widespread drug use, insubordinate behavior and unmilitary manner 
in the mixed draftee-volunteer ranks were disturbing to Army leaders, and some saw the draft‟s 
end as a chance to change those trends.  According to those Army leaders, including Army Chief 
of Staff General William Westmoreland, the AVF represented an “opportunity to restore a 
concept of military professionalism which they believed had been lost during the turmoil of the 
Vietnam era when so many unwilling conscripts had flooded the Army‟s ranks.”46  In September 
1968 (a month before Nixon announced his campaign promise to end the draft), General 
Westmoreland ordered a study of the effects of ending the draft and what the Army could do to 
recruit an all-volunteer force.
47
   
For those forward-thinking Army leaders, breaking the links in the public‟s mind 
between the Army and the inequities of the draft was crucial to restoring the Army‟s prestige and 
public image.
48
  Seizing the initiative, Westmoreland and the Army gave serious thought about 
how to make the Army more appealing to potential recruits and how to rebuild the public‟s 
esteem for the institution.  Discussions between Westmoreland‟s headquarters staff and U.S. 
Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) officials about the end of the draft were far-ranging and 
“would come to encompass everything from the war in Southeast Asia to demographic trends in 
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the United States and from the style of an individual soldier‟s haircut to the prose of the Army‟s 
advertising jingles.”49   
In October 1968, the study Westmoreland had ordered was published by Lieutenant 
Colonel Jack R. Butler as “The Career Force Study.”  It contained many important assertions and 
assumptions that would guide the Army‟s advertising efforts over the course of the AVF era.  
Butler concluded over a year before the Gates Commission did that the end of the draft would 
mean that “increased expenditures would be necessary in the areas of recruiting, public 
information and advertising.”50  Butler advised Westmoreland not to oppose the adoption of the 
AVF, as Army opposition might further fuel anti-draft and anti-war protests, further damaging 
the Army‟s public image.51  Butler‟s work emphasized the need for further study to develop 
ways to improve the Army‟s public image. 
After reading the study, Westmoreland concluded that additional research on an all-
volunteer force was required.  The resulting study, called Project Volunteer in Defense of the 
Nation (PROVIDE), was published in January 1969.  The PROVIDE staff was struck by just 
how poorly the Army was regarded by the public.  Opinion polls revealed that the general public 
and educators ranked the Army last among the services of preferred enlistment.
52
  The study 
concluded that rebuilding the Army‟s public image was a prerequisite for success with an all-
volunteer force.
53
  The PROVIDE study thus established the dual-purposes of Army advertising: 
recruitment of quality volunteers and rebuilding the Army‟s public image.   
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The PROVIDE study led the Army leadership to adopt the methods of the marketplace 
and they accepted advertising as the key means to attract youth in a competitive labor market.  
Based on demographic research and polling, PROVIDE informed the Army leadership that 
young Americans would not join the Army based on rational economic decisions, as the Gates 
Commission had concluded.  Advocates of economic rationality, such as Friedman, asserted that 
a man would enlist if the military service was the best available occupation.  Army research 
revealed that the choice was not automatic and that the Army would have to make a tempting 
offer in order to win over potential recruits.  The Army leadership concluded that they had to 
“move from models of free-market rationality to models of consumer capitalism, and with mixed 
feelings, they adopted consumer capitalism‟s most powerful tools.”54   The most important of 
those tools was paid television advertising.  Potential recruits and the public-at-large would be 
the “market,” and the Army was to be a “product.”55  The Army would have to negotiate with 
individuals for their enlistment, and television advertising would publicize the Army‟s offer.    
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CHAPTER 3 - Initial Forays into Paid Broadcast Advertising 
After committing themselves to using a market-based approach to recruitment and image 
reform, the Army turned to its market research and its advertising agency, N. W. Ayer & Son, to 
produce advertisements that would appeal to the target audiences.  The Army would have to 
overcome its traditional reliance on public service announcements (PSAs) and trust in its 
advertisers to produce a new style of television ad to capture the public‟s attention and to inform 
Americans that the Army was changing.  Development of advertising messages and imagery was 
left largely to the advertisers to craft ads that could avert potential manpower shortfalls once the 
draft was ended.  Army leaders relied on the judgment and experience of their advertisers to 
produce messages that would aid in recruitment and allow the general public see the Army in a 
new light.  Once the Army and the Ayer agency agreed upon the content of the messages, the 
Army and the advertisers enthusiastically pushed them on the air in 1971.  The basic themes 
introduced in the 1971 television advertising test, such as respect for individualism and promises 
of material gain, were enduring ones that would be used throughout the AVF era. 
Army leaders were enthusiastic about the prospects offered by paid recruitment 
advertising.  Among the most enthusiastic in promoting the new market-based approach to 
recruitment was William K. Brehm, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and 
Reserve Affairs.  In July 1969, Brehm called on the Defense Department for “„a large increase in 
Recruiting Command‟s advertising budget – now.‟”56  Brehm proposed raising the 1971 Army 
advertising budget from $3 million to $36 million, which he believed was necessary “„to let 
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advertising do for the Army what it has done successfully for business.‟”57  Brehm sought 
permission to purchase commercial radio and television airtime to reach the new target 
audiences.  Brehm believed that traditional public service announcements (PSAs) would no 
longer be enough for promoting the Army.   
In October 1970, the Department of the Army created the Office of the Special Assistant 
for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA) to oversee the Army‟s transition to an all-volunteer 
format.  Along with U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), SAMVA was responsible for 
developing new techniques to attract volunteers.  Westmoreland selected Lieutenant General 
George Forsythe to lead the new office.  
For the Defense Department Fiscal Year (FY) 1971 budget, the Army asked Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird for $131 million to fund some of the recruitment incentives devised by 
SAMVA and USAREC.
58
  While Laird did not authorize the additional funds, he allowed the 
Army to reprogram available, non-committed funds to the effort.  The Army immediately 
dedicated $10.6 million to paid radio and TV ad campaigns for that year.
59
  SAMVA and 
USAREC began to consult with their advertising agency to develop a new advertising campaign, 
which would include the Army‟s first paid television advertisements. 
N. W. Ayer & Son had been the Army‟s advertising agency since 1967, under contract 
for $3 million annually to produce public service announcements for radio and television. 
60
  
PSAs were not an especially effective means of military recruitment advertising, however, since 
they were usually only broadcast late at night or in the very early morning hours.  Airtime was 
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provided only because station owners‟ FCC licenses required it.61   Since there was no money to 
be made from them, the PSAs were buried in the broadcasters‟ daily schedules.  The result was 
that the target market had virtually no chance of seeing the PSAs.
62
  It is perhaps just as well, 
since the Ayer campaign theme was a rather uninspiring, “Your Future, Your Decision, Choose 
Army” slogan, with which SAMVA was very unimpressed.  General Forsythe and SAMVA 
began weekly meetings with the Secretary of the Army to find a new direction for Army 
advertising.
63
    
SAMVA was filled with young, innovative thinkers.  Forsythe referred to them as the 
“SAMVA warriors" and instructed them to employ the latest studies in behavioral and 
management studies to gain insight into America‟s youth.  This insight would shape the tone of 
advertising messages then in development. 
In November 1970, USAREC hosted a Joint Recruiting Conference with the other 
services.  At the conference, the Army formally unveiled its plan to conduct a paid broadcast 
advertising test in prime time.
64
  The Army planned to study local and national markets with 
phone surveys before and after a broadcast test period.
65
  The other services, recognizing the 
Army‟s plans were well ahead of their own, complained to the Defense Department.  SAMVA 
and USAREC defended their plans, asserting that “to achieve the goal of voluntary accessions, it 
will be necessary to greatly increase the reach and frequency of our advertising delivery, 
particularly against the prime target audience of young men.”66  Colonel Henry Beuke, USAREC 
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Director of Advertising and Information, explained that PSAs were no longer adequate.  “Free 
air time is welcome, but when the need exists to strongly increase reach and frequency against 
our young men target audience, clearly, public service broadcast cannot be expected to deliver.  
We must follow the lead of the razor blades, shaving creams, and automobiles, and buy the time 
necessary to deliver the audiences we need to reach.”67  Although the Department of Defense 
(DoD) leadership, including Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, generally did not favor 
purchasing airtime for recruiting commercials the Army was allowed to push ahead with its 
planned test.   
Having done their market research, SAMVA believed that the Army was making great 
“product improvements” that would appeal to youthful volunteers, such as improved pay, better 
living conditions and relaxed attitudes toward discipline.  The key would be making those 
improvements known to the target audience.  As Brehm‟s deputy John Kester told a DoD 
representative in December 1970, “The full and immediate potential of these actions [Army 
lifestyle-enhancing initiatives], however, cannot be realized unless the public is informed 
through an extensive and innovative advertising campaign which includes paid radio and TV 
[advertising].”68   
To capture the public‟s attention, SAMVA told N. W. Ayer that for the advertising test it 
would have to produce a “head turner” of an ad campaign that would generate “a dramatic 
increase in enlistments,” or SAMVA would “find someone who can.”69   
N. W. Ayer had to develop a new approach to Army advertising that would “attract 
public attention, inform the viewers and listeners of the new direction the Army was heading in, 
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and at the same time, „go for accessions.‟”70  The largest obstacle to overcome was the target 
audience‟s low regard for the Army.  As even the PROVIDE study had acknowledged, the Army 
was not particularly well regarded by American youth.  “[Y]oung American men feared that if 
they joined the Army, they would lose their personal freedom, [and they] would be submerged in 
an institution that showed no respect for individuality.”71  The Ayer agency had to craft a 
message that would allay those fears while promoting the lifestyle improvements that the Army 
was instituting.   
The Ayer agency elected to focus on General Westmoreland‟s initiatives to replace 
“policies and procedures that treated „a man like a juvenile‟ with policies based on „the principle 
that if we treat a young soldier like a responsible man he will act like one.‟”72  N. W. Ayer felt 
the television ads should stress Westmoreland‟s view that Army service should be “‟more 
enjoyable, more professionally rewarding, and less burdensome in its impact on our people and 
their families.‟”73  Those experimental improvements in Army life and less restrictive policies, 
collectively known as the Volunteer Army experiments (VOLAR), would play a central role in 
the messages of the 1971 advertising test.   
On 26 January 1971, representatives for N. W. Ayer met with Westmoreland, Forsythe 
and ranking USAREC officers to consider the central messages of the advertising test.  When the 
advertisers asked Westmoreland what he hoped the ads would look like, he said that he believed 
the volunteer army should be a partnership between an old institution and a new generation of 
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Americans.
74
  Westmoreland pointed to the VOLAR initiatives as proof that the Army was 
adapting to the changing wants and needs of potential recruits.  From that time onward, 
according to Ted Regan of N. W. Ayer, “‟VOLAR became for us a U.S.P. [unique selling 
proposition].‟”75  For Regan, VOLAR sent a message to the potential consumers: “‟We saw an 
Army changing to accommodate a different kind of young prospect.  I heard the Army saying, 
„The Army is changing; the Army wants to meet you half way.‟”76   
N. W. Ayer came up with several recruiting slogans: “Join the New Army,” “Enlist in the 
New Army,” “Join a Better Army,” “Join an Improved Army,” “Join a Changing Army,” and 
“Join Today‟s Army.”77  The agency eventually presented the Army leadership with “Today‟s 
Army Wants to Join You” and received a less than overwhelming response.  General Forsythe 
recalled, “‟We all looked at it and thought, „They can‟t be serious.  A big outfit like this and they 
can‟t come up with something better than this?‟”78  A senior USAREC officer recalled, “‟God, I 
just wanted to vomit.‟”79  General Westmoreland asked the ad men, “‟Do you have to say it that 
way?‟”80  The agency reminded the generals that the ad campaign was not intended to appeal to 
men like them, but rather to American youth with a less than positive view of the Army.  For N. 
W. Ayer, the genius of the proposed campaign was that it made enlistment in the Army seem like 
an exchange between equal parties.  “Instead of summoning young men to service with a stern-
featured Uncle Sam and a declarative command, this slogan would leave young people thinking 
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that „the Army is interested in me, in my needs as well as its own.‟”81  This theme of the Army‟s 
interest in the individual‟s needs and wants remained central to the Army‟s television 
commercials throughout the AVF era.  Beyond its reassurances that the Army was interested in 
the needs of the potential recruits, the ads portrayed the Army as a unifying agent in American 
society in divisive times, advancing the Army‟s public image in a time of social upheaval.82   
Despite their misgivings, Westmoreland and Forsythe gave their approval to N. W. 
Ayer‟s concept.  Apparently no one was more surprised that the Army leaders relented than the 
ad agency.  According to Regan, “‟We were surprised that the Army bought it.‟”83  Beth Bailey 
argues that this deference on the part of the Army leadership to the expertise of the advertisers 
marked an important shift toward the Army‟s acceptance of the role of “the logic of the market” 
in recruitment advertising.
84
  
Paid recruitment advertisements proved to be a stroke of marketing genius.  The 
“SAMVA warriors” and N. W. Ayer had done their homework.  Their market research showed 
that young men inclined toward military service would be more likely to watch television than to 
read magazines, so they concentrated on producing television ads to be aired during prime-time 
when the majority of the viewing public would be gathered around their televisions.  Prime-time 
television ads reached the primary target audiences of potential recruits and the general public 
much more effectively than the old PSAs.
85
  Network television in the 1970s consisted of three 
major networks that drew wide, diverse audiences.
86
  The target audiences need only look as far 
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as their televisions to see that the Army was changing and that it might be worth reconsidering 
their opinions about it.   
The paid broadcast advertising test began on 1 March 1971.  N. W. Ayer purchased 
airtime on 581 TV stations and 2,200 radio stations.
87
  The ads that ran during the thirteen-week 
test consisted of twenty-two different radio and television advertisements, half of which stressed 
the enlistment in combat arms (infantry, armor and artillery), while the other half were “theme” 
ads that emphasized the Army‟s new, recruit-friendly direction.88  The ads established themes 
that would characterize Army advertising through the ensuing decades.  Some of the ads shown 
during the test emphasized job experience or skill training, while others emphasized individuality 
and personal freedom.
89
  They allowed Americans to see the Army as a benevolent institution, 
hoping to reconnect with America and its youth without forcing military service on anyone.  
Themes emphasizing individual opportunity in the Army were showcased, while ideas of public 
service were absent.  The Army, using Moskos‟s definitions, was promoting itself, first and 
foremost, as an occupation as opposed to an institution.   
  The Department of Defense required that the results of the test be gathered in a 
scientific and fair manner, “strictly monitored” by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manning and Reserve Affairs).
90
  The ASD(M&RA) told the Army that “[W]e must 
know and approve in advance messages to be used and the location of the proposed test 
broadcasts…[and] either (a) to examine and approve the Army‟s plan for evaluating the results 
or (b) to arrange for an outside evaluation by an independent organization obtained by OSD 
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[Office of the Secretary of Defense].”91  Eager to get started, however, the Army contracted N. 
W. Ayer as the outside monitoring organization for the test.  Obviously, this created a conflict of 
interest.  The advertising “test” was in truth not a test at all, but rather a full-scale 
implementation of the Army‟s “Today‟s Army Wants to Join You” campaign.  The Army had 
largely sidestepped the intent of the ASD(M&RA) directives by running the ads in several key 
markets without an objective monitoring agency.  The era of paid television advertising was thus 
begun with a bit of chicanery on the part of the U.S. Army. 
However, the success of the test was readily apparent.  During the run of the test, Army 
enlistments increased by 4,000 new soldiers over the same period of the previous year.
92
  Two 
significant surveys validated the success of the test, since N. W. Ayer was not a disinterested 
third party.  The first survey, “U.S. Army Recruiting Advertising Test,” was conducted by the 
polling firm Rome, Arnold & Company of Chicago at the request of N. W. Ayer and USAREC.  
The second survey commissioned by SAMVA, “Effectiveness of the Modern Volunteer Army 
Advertising Program,” was conducted by the Stanford Research Institute, an independent non-
profit research group.  Rome, Arnold & Company evaluated “pre” and “post” telephone surveys 
on a “random national sample of young civilian men aged 17-21” in late February and on “a 
different but comparable group in May at the close of the campaign.”93  They evaluated similar 
phone interviews with fathers of men aged 17-21.  “The objective of these surveys was to 
measure the awareness among the target audience of specific benefits mentioned in the Army‟s 
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advertising campaign and to measure the advertising recall of the commercial‟s copy points.”94  
An additional goal was to “measure the gains in favorability toward the Army as a result of the 
advertising.”95  The surveys showed the advertisements had raised awareness and recall of the 
new Army ads, although the ads apparently had only a minimal effect in changing the audiences‟ 
perceptions of the Army.  Recall of Army advertising over the course of the paid advertising test 
rose from 38% to 84% among the young men surveyed and from 14% to 70% among fathers 
surveyed.
96
  Thirty-four percent of the young men surveyed recalled the Army‟s new slogan, 
“Today‟s Army Wants to Join You,” while thirty-five percent of fathers surveyed could recall 
it.
97
  The report noted, “The study does not demonstrate any gains in young men‟s verbal 
attitudes toward the Army, as a result of the advertising,”98 but “advertising did produce among 
fathers, limited but measurable gain in attitudes -  particularly in reducing strong negative 
feelings toward the Army.”99  In sum, the Rome report concluded that the Army‟s advertising 
test was “highly effective in reaching the primary target audience of 17-21 year old men,”100 
while awareness of Army advertising among fathers had “also increased significantly.”101  In 
addition, the Rome report showed that television advertising “overwhelmed all other media as 
the source of exposure to the new Army advertising campaign,” with sixty-nine percent of young 
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men and seventy-one percent of the fathers reporting that they had seen the ads on television as 
opposed to any other medium.
102
   
The Stanford Research Institute (SRI) report supported the Rome report‟s conclusions.  
The SRI study similarly concluded that the Army‟s paid advertising “was very effective in 
increasing awareness of Army advertising among young male Americans” and that it “was 
effective in motivating some of these young men to the action represented by making personal 
inquiry about the Army service for themselves.”103  The report lauded the placement of the ads 
“adjacent to programs considered to have high appeal to the primary audience of 17-to-21-year-
old males and other persons believed to be able to influence the primary audience,” such as 
“Laugh In,” “The Flip Wilson Show,” “Bonanza,” “Mannix,” and “Wide World of Sports.”104  
The report also commended the ads‟ introduction of humor into Army advertising.  For instance, 
one ad featured a man “extolling the features of a tank in the patter of an automobile salesman,” 
prompting a young would-be recruit to exclaim, “I‟ll take it!”105  Incidentally, the SRI report 
noted that the tank commercial was the one most recalled by young men and fathers polled in the 
Rome report. 
The Rome and SRI reports both indicated the power and reach of paid television 
advertising and served as a vindication of the Army‟s paid advertising test.  Those successes led 
N. W. Ayer and the Army to plan for another round of paid advertising tests to be conducted 
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from 26 July to 3 September 1971 for an additional $3.1 million.
106
  However, unforeseen 
circumstances and the resistance of the influential House Armed Services Committee Chairman, 
Representative F. Edward Hebert (D-LA), led to the cancellation of the second round of tests.  
Although the 1971 had indicated the strong potential of paid broadcast advertising in advancing 
the Army‟s recruitment and public image reform goals, the positive results of the test were 
drowned out by congressional criticisms.  In the end, Army advertising in the mid-1970s reverted 
back to the use of PSAs.  
                                                 
106
 Rostker, 156. 
 32 
CHAPTER 4 - Using the Lessons Learned from the 1971 Test  
The Army‟s plans to continue paid television advertising after the 1971 “test” did not 
survive congressional criticism.  Despite the promising results of the 1971 test and the findings 
of the Rome and SRI reports, paid television advertising was dropped as a way to communicate 
the Army messages to its target audiences.  However, during the suspension of paid television 
advertising,  N. W. Ayer took the lessons learned from the 1971 test to develop further the 
messages and imagery of the PSAs.  Even though PSA broadcasts were, once again, a low 
priority for the television station owners, Army message strategy and image development 
progressed through the mid-1970s. 
As previously noted, Representative F. Edward Hebert led the charge against paid 
military advertising.  He strongly felt that government money should not be spent on publicly 
owned airwaves.
107
  Hebert‟s opposition to broadcast advertising might well have been a 
budgetary concern, but various authors have indicated that Hebert, a newspaperman in his home 
state of Louisiana, may have had other reasons for opposing paid broadcast advertising by the 
military.  A CBS documentary called The Selling of the Pentagon, a critique of the defense 
industries and their influence in Washington, had aired in January 1971 and elicited Hebert‟s ire 
for the broadcast media.
108
  Additionally, radio and television station managers who had not been 
included in the Army‟s test complained to their congressmen about the selective distribution of 
public funds.
109
  Other advertising agencies complained to Congress that N. W. Ayer was 
                                                 
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Bailey, 71. 
109
 Griffith, 144. 
 33 
receiving a “sweetheart deal” from the government because the advertising contract for the test 
ads had been made without a bidding process.
110
   
 Secretary of Defense Laird, now past his initial resistance to paid military advertising 
after hearing of the Army test‟s success, complained to President Nixon in August 1971 that the 
loss of paid broadcast advertising would be an “obstacle to continued progress in Army 
enlistments,” noting with alarm that the “Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee has 
indicated a strong determination to prevent further use of paid TV/radio advertising for 
recruiting.”111  The new Secretary of the Army, Robert F. Froehlke, said Hebert‟s refusal to 
allow paid advertising “‟makes it extremely difficult for us to maintain the momentum of our 
current effort… and diminishes the Defense Department‟s prospects for a volunteer force in the 
longer term.‟”112  But Froehlke himself noted in a memo dated 29 July 1971 that, “using paid 
radio/TV advertising was dead for the time being.”113  The Army was forced to accept that, for 
the foreseeable future, television advertisements would revert to PSAs banished to the least 
desirable time slots on the broadcasters‟ schedules.  However, N. W. Ayer and the U.S. Army 
had seen the effect that television commercials with high production quality could have on the 
target audiences.   
With paid television advertising removed as an option for recruiting, the Army began to 
ponder how it could attract “quality” volunteers.  Army leaders regarded recruits entering the 
service in 1972 as not of the highest caliber.
114
  In January 1973, USAREC applied higher 
standards to incoming recruits for recruiters to get credit towards their monthly quotas.  The 
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changes in the Army‟s standards of acceptance resulted in a recruitment shortfall of 12,000 new 
soldiers in May 1973.
115
  The Defense Department and Congress began to suspect that the Army, 
still smarting from the decision to end paid broadcast advertising, was purposely missing its 
recruitment goals in an effort to sabotage the AVF.  Although this charge was never conclusively 
proven, it remains an interesting possibility.  Regardless of the reasons, USAREC reinstated the 
previous, lower quality requirement for new soldiers in July 1973.
116
  
Army television advertising reverted to PSAs from 1971 to 1976.  These PSAs relied on 
selling points that had been developed for the paid television advertising test of 1971.  Like the 
test ads, the PSAs of the early 1970s never attempted to appeal to recruits‟ sense of patriotism or 
civic obligation, and certainly made no mention of combat.   
The “John Travolta” PSA from 1973 was typical of the appeal to recruits‟ monetary 
consideration.  In the 30-second ad, a recruit in Army fatigues (portrayed by a very young John 
Travolta) stands in front of an Army pay officer, who is behind a stark white counter.  Travolta‟s 
soldier is clean-cut, but his hair resembles a longer, civilian cut and not a traditional military-
style shave.  A monotone narration says the soldier is getting his starting pay of $288 a month 
pay.  Travolta, assisted by a lovely young woman in uniform, then pushes a shopping cart down 
the counter, where a model of a barracks building is placed on the cart.  The narrator then notes 
that the soldier may not even need the monthly pay, as his housing is free.  Moving further down 
the counter, Travolta meets a beautiful, exotic-looking woman who places a lei around his neck 
and kisses his cheek as the narrator notes that soldiers receive thirty days of paid vacation a year.  
The narrator then asks, “What are you going to do with that $288 every month?” then slyly 
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notes, “You‟ll think of something” as Travolta drives away in a new car.117  The ad‟s intent is to 
get potential recruits thinking of the material gains (and possibly romantic/sexual opportunities) 
that could be theirs if they sign up for the Army.  No mention is made of what Travolta‟s soldier 
actually does in the Army, nor is there any mention of national service.  Nothing is being asked 
of Travolta‟s soldier, he does not even need a military-regulation haircut, while his every 
material wish is literally being handed to him.  According to this PSA, Army service is a one-
way street, with the Army paying a young man‟s way through life and presenting him with a way 
to gain material advantages (paid vacations, free housing and a new car) while expecting nothing 
in return for this largesse.   
Another sample PSA from this period similarly stresses what a new recruit can expect 
from the Army while making no mention of the expectations or demands placed on soldiers.  In 
“Goodbye,” a PSA from 1973 produced as part of N. W. Ayer‟s “Join the People Who Have 
Joined the Army” campaign, another young man is telling a succession of beautiful girls that he 
has joined the Army and must sadly tell them goodbye.  The young man tells each of them that 
he wants her “to be the first to know” of his enlistment.  He is handsome, with a civilian-style 
haircut, and appears to be something of a “ladies‟ man.”  The punchline for the ad is delivered 
when one of the girls asks the recruit, “When did you join?” to which he replies with a sly smile, 
“Oh, actually, last July,” with a voice-over narration explaining that the Army‟s Delayed Entry 
Program (DEP) option allows new recruits up to twelve months to enter the Army after signing 
the enlistment contract.
118
  Humor in recruiting advertising, first utilized in the 1971 advertising 
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test, thus reappeared as the lighter side of a young man‟s decision to join the Army.  Here the 
Army‟s DEP enlistment option was portrayed as an opportunity for new recruits to enjoy their 
personal freedom for a while longer prior to their Army service with, again, no demands or 
expectations from the Army.  The individual‟s wants, needs and comforts, not the demands of 
Army life, are the centerpiece of the advertisement.   
An Army Reserve commercial from 1974 reflects some new thinking about the Army‟s 
target audience for recruitment.  Titled “This Weekend,” the commercial is aimed specifically at 
young women, a demographic that the Army and Ayer had not considered important during the 
1971 advertising test.  The ad shows a series of attractive young women being accosted by 
would-be suitors.  The men ask the various women, “What are you doing this weekend?” with 
the women‟s replies varying from tracking a hurricane to packing parachutes and jumping from 
airplanes.  The narrator informs the female audience that they can join other women at a 
“challenging job” for one weekend a month in the Army Reserve as yet another attractive 
woman descends a staircase in dress Army uniform to link arms with her civilian beau.
119
  
Unlike the previously mentioned commercials, this one implies that the Army Reserve would 
demand something of its recruits and notes that the Army Reserve would be challenging.  But the 
“challenge” was not the central theme of the advertisement.  Instead, the viewer is left with the 
impression that the Army Reserve offers a unique adventure for women looking for something 
different and unusual, instead of a routine life of looking pretty and having an active social life.  
Realistic depictions of Army life remained largely absent from the PSAs throughout the mid-
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1970s; the focus remained on bargaining with young people on an individual basis in exchange 
for material benefits. 
Paid television advertising was never far from the minds of the Army and DOD leaders 
during the 1971 to 1976 stoppage.  Speaking to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman 
John Stennis in 1972, Secretary of Defense Laird stressed the potential for television advertising 
in Army recruiting.  Laird told Stennis that “[e]stimates indicate that by using television and 
radio advertising and without increasing its FY 1973 expenditure for advertising, the Army could 
obtain more than 10,000 additional male enlistments. … We believe that we should have the 
flexibility to test this option if necessary under careful control by the Office [of the] Secretary of 
Defense.”120  Stennis was more open to the potential of paid advertising than Hebert had been in 
1971.  When Hebert was ousted from the chairmanship of the House Armed Services Committee 
by liberal Democrats in 1975, the road appeared open for the military to take another look at paid 
television advertising.   
However, the Defense Department and Army had to demonstrate to Congress that paid 
advertising was more effective than PSAs.  Dr. Al J. Martin, the Defense Department‟s Special 
Assistant for Accessions Policy, devised a new criteria for testing ad effectiveness.  Following 
the basic methodology of the 1971 Army test, Martin used telephone surveys before, during and 
after some paid radio commercials aired in October 1975. The study reported that “[e]nough 
statistically significant results were found in excess of the number expected by chance to warrant 
the conclusion that paid radio made an incremental contribution to the advertising and recruiting 
programs of the Services as a whole in test markets where used in conjunction with other media 
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advertising.”121  This confirmed the findings of the Army‟s test in 1971.  As a result, paid 
advertisements were again allowed by Congress for use in military recruiting efforts beginning in 
October 1976.
122
 
Despite the continued development and increasing sophistication of Army PSA 
advertising and the reintroduction of paid advertising in 1976, Army recruiting in the late 1970s 
was in a moribund state.  The Army missed its recruiting goals in 1979 by 17,000 recruits.  Less 
than stellar recruiting numbers, combined with reports of unethical recruitment practices 
(including falsifying high school diplomas and concealing recruits‟ police records) led 
policymakers and some military leaders to consider that the AVF might very well have been a 
mistake and that the low quality of volunteers threatened the nation‟s security.  As the baby 
boom generation grew older, the pool of military-eligible young men was growing smaller.
123
  
To make matters worse, research revealed that among this smaller population, willingness to 
serve in the military was gradually eroding.  Increased aspirations to attend college and a general 
disinclination toward public service characterized youth attitudes of late 1970s.  This lack of 
interest, combined with the problems of crime, demoralization and prevalent drug use within the 
Army, led the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer, to label the late 
1970s force as the “Hollow Army.”  As the decade closed, Army advertising appeared to be 
failing in both its recruitment and public-image enhancement functions.   If the situation had not 
changed, the success of AVF itself might well have been threatened.  
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CHAPTER 5 - Early 1980s: Success in Recruitment and Public 
Image Enhancement 
Army recruitment at the dawn of the 1980s appeared to be a lost cause.  Increasing 
disinterest among youth, recruiting scandals and lingering low public esteem for the Army 
threatened recruitment efforts.  Beginning in 1980, under the vigorous leadership of General 
Maxwell Reid Thurman, U.S. Army Recruiting Command made great strides in turning the 
desperate situation around.  During Thurman‟s tenure, USAREC and N. W. Ayer created one of 
the most successful advertising campaigns of all time, “Be All You Can Be.”  At the same time, 
politicians such as President Ronald Reagan along with the media publicly praised the nation‟s 
military.  Portrayals of the services in public discourse and in popular entertainment began to 
raise public esteem for the military just as advertising was showing Americans a new, “can-do” 
Army armed with the latest technology.  For Army television advertising, the early 1980s were a 
golden age.  However, as in the 1970s ads, the “Be All You Can Be” campaign continued to 
emphasize the Army‟s willingness to negotiate with individuals while deemphasizing the 
demands of Army life and the institutional values of the service.  All the while, Hollywood, 
media pundits and politicians increasingly took over the image-crafting function that had 
originally been intended as a component of Army advertising.     
In 1979, facing grim recruiting prospects, General Meyer appointed General Thurman to 
take over and revitalize USAREC.  In 1992, Thurman recalled how he received the assignment: 
“So, one morning along about mid-November [1979], I got a call from the Chief, General Shy 
Meyer.  He had a direct line to my phone.  He said, „Come over here; I want to talk to you.‟  So I 
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went over there.  He said, “You are going to go out and command the Recruiting Command.‟  I 
said, „Who are you talking to?  You aren‟t talking to me.‟  I turned around and he said, „Now 
look, you son of a bitch, you are going to go out and command the Recruiting Command.  I want 
you there in two weeks to take it over.‟”124  Despite his seeming lack of enthusiasm at the outset, 
the man regarded by many authors as the single most important individual to Army advertising 
took over the troubled command.
125
  
Almost immediately, Thurman decided that changes needed to be made to both USAREC 
and the existing advertising.  His wanted the organization to take new steps to advance the dual 
purposes of making the service more appealing to potential recruits and improving the Army‟s 
image.  After implementing new oversight procedures at recruiting stations around the country, 
Thurman turned his attention to the state of Army advertising.  Thurman derisively referred to N. 
W. Ayer as “the people who had given the Army the famous, „The Army wants to join you,‟ and 
other such not so great slogans.”126  Thurman intended to “grab hold of the advertising 
business… to change the product.”127  For Thurman, Army advertising was “to orient [the] 
product on the person to whom the sale was meant to be made,” which he believed USAREC 
advertising in the 1970s had failed to do.
128
  Thurman believed that USAREC officials should 
learn more about advertising and that the Ayer agency should be producing commercials under 
closer direction from USAREC.  Thurman wanted Army advertising to convey the advantages of 
                                                 
124
 Maxwell R. Thurman, Oral History [Transcript], 1992, Tape T154 - Side 2, U.S. Army Accessions 
Command, 188-189. 
125
 Rostker, 387. 
126
 Maxwell R. Thurman, Oral History [Transcript], 1992, Tape T157- Side 1, U.S. Army Accessions 
Command, 197. 
127
 Ibid. 
128
 Ibid., 198. 
 41 
Army service.  For Thurman, promising young people material comfort in exchange for signing 
up was not the central message that the Army should be sending.  Thurman recalled a “come to 
Jesus” talk with the account executives at N. W. Ayer in Chicago, in which he fired the account 
manager and informed the agency “that I was in charge of advertising.  They weren‟t in charge 
of it, I was.”129  After this harsh beginning, Thurman later recalled, USAREC and N. W. Ayer 
“became a team” that worked together (under Thurman‟s stringent terms) to produce a new 
vision of the Army.  The result was the “Be All You Can Be” campaign of 1980, one of the most 
memorable campaigns in the history of advertising.
130
  
In a 1996 book on the AVF, Thurman described thirteen important actions that turned the 
1979 recruiting failure around.  One of the actions he listed was the development of a new 
marketing research program aimed at gaining a better understanding of America‟s youth and 
what advertising messages would appeal to them. 
131
  The research initiative was a joint venture 
conducted by USAREC, N. W. Ayer, the RAND Corporation, the United States Military 
Academy at West Point, and the Army Research Institute (ARI).  The research relied heavily on 
data collected by the Defense Department‟s Youth Attitudinal Tracking Surveys (YATS), an 
annual survey that gauged youth attitudes toward the armed services.  Additionally, marketing 
focus groups were used to determine the types of imagery and messages that most appealed to 
the youthful audience.  Thurman claimed that this joint research venture in market research was 
extremely valuable in guiding his decisions regarding advertising, because “[u]nderstanding the 
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market is crucial to business success.”132  The Army‟s research showed that while potential 
recruits still sought acknowledgement of their individual identities, educational opportunities and 
learning marketable skills were also important to them as they faced a recession in the early 
1980s.  The “Be All You Can Be” campaign was tailored to assure potential recruits that the 
Army could provide those things, a durable message that would remain in Army advertising for 
decades.  However, despite Thurman‟s assertions to the contrary, the 1980s messages with their 
continued willingness to strike bargains with individual recruits in exchange for their enlistment 
were not terribly different from those of the 1970s.      
Thurman credited the Army‟s “Be All You Can Be” campaign with changing the public‟s 
perception of the Army from “Willie and Joe” to the “high-tech Army of Desert Storm featuring 
Abrams tanks, Apache helicopters and, most important, quality people.”133  Television ads were 
the centerpiece of the campaign, which premiered in 1980.  The Army‟s “blitz” campaign 
attempted to ingrain Army imagery into youthful minds through broad exposure and repetition.  
Besides broadcast and print advertising, half a million bumper stickers were printed, and “Be All 
That You Can Be!” music was distributed to 16,000 high school band directors.134  The new 
campaign was aggressive and upbeat and promised American youth adventure, skill training and 
a dependable income while acknowledging and respecting their individualism.  Patriotic appeals 
for national service were absent from the Army‟s messages of the early 1980s. 
The memorable 1982 ad, “9 a.m.,” is typical of Thurman‟s new Army ads.  Set to the 
upbeat Army tune, “Be All That You Can Be!” that contains lines such as “You‟re reaching deep 
inside you” and “It‟s been rough – tough going – but you haven‟t gone alone!” the ad depicts an 
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early morning airborne drop from the perspective of a young soldier.  Featuring impressive 
military machines (an Air Force C-130 transport aircraft and a wheeled personnel transport 
dropped by parachute),  the commercial shows airborne soldiers dropping to the ground, 
recovering the vehicle and moving out smartly as the narrator notes that “We do more before 9 
a.m. than most people do all day.”  The ad ends with the young African American soldier sitting 
on the ground drinking from a tin canteen cup, cheerfully saying, “Hey, First Sergeant.  Good 
morning!”135  While the ad‟s themes of personal challenge and high-tech Army equipment 
largely depart from 1970s ads featuring pay and benefits, the focus  in the ad remains on the 
individual soldier, just as in those earlier ads.  He is clearly a competent young man who, with 
his Army training, met the challenges he has faced and became better for the experience.  He is a 
member of a team and is readily accepted by his teammates.  No mention is made of his pay or 
benefits, just as his motivation for enlisting in the first place remains unknown.  The demands 
placed on the soldier are also absent from the ad.  The ad is a straightforward offer of social 
acceptance, job training and confidence-building in the face of adversity.  Like the ads of the 
1970s, this ad is an offer from the Army to the individual, with no mention being made of what 
the Army would expect in turn. 
A different theme, “opportunity,” is featured in another commercial from that ad 
campaign.  In “Theme Rev.” from 1982, a small, racially-mixed high school class of men and 
women is featured in the opening shot.  The narrator acknowledges that “Right now, the one 
thing you want most is an opportunity.”  The rest of the commercial features an assortment of 
soldiers performing various Army activities including jumping from airplanes, working with 
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high-tech radar scopes, writing Korean-language characters on a blackboard, and running 
through the woods with camouflage-painted faces.  It ends with a young soldier, surrounded by 
two smiling friends, being handed his sergeant stripes by a smiling, older-looking soldier 
(presumably his first sergeant).
136
  This ad provides a new take on the recurring theme of the 
Army providing for its recruits while asking for precious little in return.  The message conveyed 
was that regardless of whether the person was a technophile, an adrenaline junkie, or 
mechanically inclined, the Army could suit his or her individual tastes with a job doing whatever 
it was that appealed to him or her.     
The Army College Fund (ACF) was a new program featured in the campaign‟s 
advertising to entice recruits with college aspirations.  In the ad “Good Company,” the ACF is 
the centerpiece.  The narrator begins, “Last year, 90,000 high school graduates joined the Army.”  
Against a backdrop of soldiers exercising, riding in armored personnel carriers and tanks, and 
conducting field training, the narrator explains that some of those graduates joined for the 
challenge, some for the excitement, while others came for the new ACF.  He then explains the 
terms of the ACF, where for every dollar a soldier contributed toward his education, the Army 
would contribute “five or more” for a total of $15,200 of college money after two years of 
enlisted service.  The ACF informational booklet is featured in its own shot near the end of the 
ad.
137
  This ad is the clearest yet in stating a quid pro quo exchange to America‟s youth: sign up 
for the Army, and the Army will help provide for your education.  Just as in the 1970s, the Army 
is presenting itself as a short-term means to better one‟s lot in life.   
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New technologies and weaponry figure prominently in the ads of the early 1980s, 
demonstrating that the Army would expose recruits to cutting-edge technology.  “Bradley” is one 
such advertisement showcasing Army technology.  The ad features an infantry team returning 
from a night mission in some misty, wooded terrain.  They are heavily camouflaged, with night-
vision goggles and a sophisticated FM radio to communicate with a nearby M-2 Bradley Infantry 
Fighting Vehicle (IFV).  The vehicle commander receives the infantrymen‟s message from his 
position inside the vehicle, while the narrator explains that “in today‟s Army” infantrymen are 
“armed with technology.”  The vehicle commander declares that with the thermal sights of his 
Bradley, he “can turn night into day, and guide his unit home.”138  The ad promises America‟s 
youth that, in the Army, they will learn the latest in technology, with an underlying suggestion 
that this will serve them well in their post-Army careers.  This advertisement offers imagery 
meant to appeal to the adrenaline junkies who might enjoy the combat-oriented aspects of Army 
life (as portrayed by the dismounted but still technologically outfitted soldiers) as well as to 
recruits who might be enamored with high-tech gadgetry.  The ads did not depict a combat scene 
or give any impression of what a Bradley was actually supposed to do in battle.  The imagery 
and the Army‟s offer are simple and non-threatening: join the Army and get a unique chance to 
play with some amazing toys. 
The promise of high-tech training pervades many of the ads of the 1980s.  In “Space 
Age,” a young soldier looks straight into the camera and tells the viewer, “Technology is taking 
over the world.  You can keep up with it, or you‟re going to be left behind.  That‟s why I joined 
the Army.”  As the viewer is treated to images of soldiers at work inside a radar station, the 
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narrator tells the viewer that the “world‟s largest school for high-tech skills is the Army.”  The 
soldier, upon the successful completion of his mission inside the station, informs the viewer, “I 
don‟t intend to get left behind.”139  The dialogue is intended less to highlight the high-tech skills 
the Army offered new soldiers than to threaten young people with occupational obsolescence.  It 
conveys the idea that technology is moving quickly and that some would be “left behind.”  The 
ad holds up the Army as a chance for young people to gain marketable skills in a technologically 
demanding environment.  The ad‟s tone is so urgent that it seemingly leaves the viewer with a 
momentous choice: join the Army and remain marketable, or run the risk of being unemployable 
in a world where technology is “taking over.”     
Patriotism, commitment and selfless service remained absent from the Army‟s 
advertising campaign of the early 1980s.  Appealing to young Americans‟ hopes to improve their 
economic, educational and social mobility, the Army‟s ads conveyed a familiar message: join the 
Army for the short term, and your dreams of a promising future after your time in the service 
will be realized.  The ads were not selling the Army‟s mission to fight and win the nation‟s wars, 
the demands of an Army career, or patriotism as a public virtue.  Yet it was in the early 1980s 
that public patriotism and an idealized image of soldiers began to emerge in the public 
consciousness.  Army television advertising was not the impetus for this emergence, however.  
Important sources for this resurgence in patriotic fervor included President Ronald Reagan and 
Hollywood. 
President Reagan continually praised the men and women of America‟s armed forces and 
held them up as exemplars of civic virtue.  Reagan wished to bolster the image of servicemen 
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and women and to reverse the prevalent anti-militarism of the Vietnam and Watergate era.  
Andrew Bacevich noted that President Jimmy Carter seemed to forget to ask for the public‟s 
support of the military, whereas Reagan emphasized the importance of creating a new, mythic 
image for soldiers.  According to Bacevich, “Carter managed to convey the impression that he 
took American soldiers for granted.  Ronald Reagan made a point of emphasizing that he did 
not.”140  Reagan spoke often of servicemembers in his public addresses and told Americans that 
they were special people.  Reagan‟s exultation of the military evoked the “good old days” of 
public, vocal patriotism.  
Reagan‟s reasons for elevating soldiers to this lofty position of public regard were simple, 
according to Bacevich.  He argues in The New American Militarism, “Celebrating the American 
in uniform, past and present, offered Reagan a means of rallying support for his broader political 
agenda.  His manipulation of symbols also offered a sanitized version of U.S. military history 
and fostered a romanticized portrait of those who made it.  These were essential to reversing the 
anti-military climate that was a by-product of Vietnam and by extension essential to policies that 
Reagan intended to implement.”141   
Reagan‟s elevation of the American soldier influenced how Americans viewed their civic 
responsibilities.  Reagan‟s public support for the troops set America‟s military on a pedestal 
apart from mainstream America.  Reagan had helped to create a myth of a noble class of 
soldiers, exemplifying all that was good in America, but somehow not part of day-to-day 
America.
142
  While Reagan and others praised the U.S. military, the interest of young people in 
military service steadily declined during this same period.
143
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Americans had been losing a sense of identification with the military before the 1980s.  
In the 1950s, public opinion data showed that Americans had gained knowledge of the military 
largely from family members or friends who had served.  Exposure to the military in this earlier 
generation did not depend on the mass media or public figures; they experienced it through the 
memories of those close to them.
144
  In the draft era, the rotation of citizens through the ranks 
created a large population of veterans, obviating the need for myths and rendering idealization of 
the military and warfare impossible.
145
  However, beginning in the 1960s, media depictions of 
the armed services became much more influential in shaping the public‟s perception of its 
military.  Most Americans of military age in the 1960s were not needed for military service, 
barring the outbreak of World War III.  So the public began losing its ability to identify with 
soldiers and that trend continued through the 1970s and beyond.  The lack of familiarity with 
veterans contributed to the growing disinterest among America‟s youth in military service in the 
1980s, even as the president and the mass media were extolling the virtues of America‟s service 
members.
146
   
The aura of the American soldier removed him from the purview of the American citizen, 
enabling the young to trust that someone else would shoulder the burden.  Americans bought into 
the idea that there was a separate class of people who would fill the ranks of the U.S. military.  
According to authors Roth-Douquet and Schaeffer, Middle America believed it had moved 
“beyond” military service.  “With all those college degrees and the upward mobility, the idea of 
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military service had been abandoned.”147  “Citizenship” in Reagan‟s America did not require a 
commitment to national service; “the assumption was that one‟s children didn‟t need to do 
anything to earn citizenship other than get good grades and then a good job as fast as 
possible.”148  Affluence and the material comforts provided by a good-paying job outside of the 
military increasingly trumped the offers being made by the Army‟s advertisements.  “When 
recruitment appeals are essentially occupational, a young man is unlikely to enlist if doing so 
makes no sense in occupational terms.  The army‟s „Be All That You Can Be‟ advertising slogan 
– the ultimate me-decade line – cannot be effective in recruiting those for whom the army clearly 
does not offer a plausible means for maximizing their potential.”149  By the early-to-mid 1980s, it 
was becoming increasingly clear that since the Army had opted to compete with other employers 
for the pool of American youth, its offers had to remain competitive in order to keep the youths‟ 
attention.    
As President Reagan praised America‟s men and women in uniform, an outpouring of 
support arose from Hollywood and the media.  While Army ads busied themselves making quid 
pro quo deals with individuals, movie and television producers took it upon themselves to tell 
Americans what values guided the military.  In its portrayal of the military, Hollywood 
increasingly stressed just how different military men and women were from other Americans. 
Andrew Bacevich observes, “[T]here can be no doubt that prevailing attitudes toward the 
armed services underwent a sea-change during the Reagan era.  Nowhere was this transformation 
more clearly in evidence than in Hollywood….  [S]ome filmmakers began to evolve a more 
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sympathetic portrayal – in essence producing celluloid adaptations of various Reaganesque 
motifs.  In the course of doing so, they made a great deal of money and – whether intentionally 
or not – helped to etch more deeply into the popular consciousness interpretations of war, 
military life, and recent U.S. military history that Reagan himself was enthusiastically 
promoting.”150  Hollywood created a new icon: the “action-adventure hero.”  Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, Sylvester Stallone and others created roles that emphasized guns, explosions 
and speedy getaways.  Like the mythic soldier, action-adventure heroes were a breed apart from 
everyday Americans.  Both the mythic soldier and action hero could resolve problems through 
firepower and action, while possessing moral self-assuredness.  One explanation for the success 
of military and action films is that working-class white men (the primary audiences for 1980s 
action films) “had to contend with increasing economic instability and dislocation, the perception 
of gains by people of color at the expense of the White working class, and a women‟s movement 
that overtly challenged male hegemony.  In the face of these pressures, then, it is not surprising 
that White men (especially but not exclusively working-class) would latch onto big, muscular, 
violent men as cinematic heroes.”151  According to Jackson Katz, for white males threatened by a 
perceived loss of status, accepting Hollywood images of manly action heroes provided “a 
concrete means of achieving and asserting „manhood.‟”152 
The “war picture” had been a Hollywood staple since the beginnings of the film industry.  
Depictions of war and soldiers provide drama and action for audiences.  In the 1980s, images of 
American armed forces were overwhelmingly positive.  Many military-themed films of the 
1980s did exceptionally well at the box office and provided Americans with a new, idealized 
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vision of those who served in America‟s Army even as the gulf between the public and the 
military grew.  Americans became enamored with an image of its military.  The reality of 
military service, however, held increasingly little appeal for Americans.  
Military-themed movies were among the biggest box office draws in the early-to-mid 
1980s.  In 1982, An Officer and a Gentleman was the year‟s third grossing film with $129 
million. 
153
  The Rambo series of films portrayed the near-superheroic efforts of a forgotten 
soldier from the Vietnam War who embodied honor and love of country but found himself 
battling not only foreign enemies, but ignoble, “oily and conniving politicians” at home.154  The 
biggest military film of the 1980s was Tom Cruise‟s Top Gun (1986).  Andrew Bacevich notes 
that “[w]hereas First Blood Part II picked at old wounds, Top Gun magically made those 
wounds disappear….  [I]t offered a glittering new image of warfare especially suited to 
American strengths….  [I]t invested military life with a hipness not seen even in the heyday of 
World War II propaganda movies.”155  Top Gun was the top grossing movie of 1986 with $176 
million in earnings.
156
  The film conveyed the message that war is a sanitized, technology-based 
affair in which the good guys face challenges, but win out in the end over a nameless, faceless 
enemy.
157
  Top Gun depicted America‟s warrior class with “individual daring and heroism, 
mastery of technology, patriotism, masculine power.”158  Hollywood depictions of new, 
technology-based “clean” warfare executed by highly competent and clean-cut warriors prepared 
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Americans “for Desert Storm with the glorification of military heroism mixed with a fetishism of 
high-tech weaponry.”159  According to Bacevich, 1980s America was ready to believe in the 
abilities of the new, mythic warriors depicted by Hollywood.  Bacevich argues that the films 
“created a second competing narrative [in opposition to 1970s anti-militarism], one that depicted 
soldiers, military life, and war itself in ways that would have been either unthinkable or 
unmarketable in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam.”160  
Jackson Katz also asserts that it was not just Hollywood that advanced a new image of 
manliness in the 1980s.  He argues that both Army and non-military advertising promoted 
products that appealed to white male consumers looking to capture and project a manly, 
adventurous image for themselves.
161
  Although some Army advertising of the 1980s showed the 
“gung ho” type of imagery Katz is discussing, the prevailing messages of the Army‟s ads had 
more to do with promising opportunities to new recruits and preparing them for their post-Army 
careers than with soothing white, working-class male egos.  
 The early-to-mid 1980s presented a paradox for Army recruiting.  The president and the 
media were crafting a mythic class of virtuous and noble warriors whose purpose was to defend 
the nation.  At the same time, America‟s youth, with fewer and fewer first-hand ties to the 
military, was growing increasingly enamored with the upward mobility and affluence promised 
through college attendance and a high-paying job.  Military service, while enjoying elevated 
public status and image, was increasingly losing its appeal among youth, resulting in growing 
challenges for the Army‟s advertisers and recruiters. 
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CHAPTER 6 - Promises of Educational and Occupational 
Opportunities 
As the 1980s wore on, Army television advertising focused more on explicit promises of 
educational opportunity and preparing recruits for their future careers after their Army service.  
Explicit messages equating Army service as a quid pro quo exchange with individuals to realize 
their future career and educational goals dominated Army television advertising of the late 1980s 
through the 1990s.  While television advertising around the time of the 1991 Gulf War featured 
some patriotic imagery and messages, the overwhelming majority of advertisements of the 
period focused recruits on promises that the Army could make dreams of a good job and college 
attendance come true.  The Gulf War-inspired ads and PSAs notwithstanding, patriotism and 
public service remained absent from most Army advertising.  Ads from this time also did little to 
advance the Army‟s efforts to improve its image with the public; media coverage of the victory 
over Iraq in 1991did more to enhance the military‟s public image than advertising messages 
possibly could. 
The Army‟s focus on more explicit offers of educational and occupational assistance in 
exchange for a few years of service appears to have coincided with a change in advertising 
agencies.  In 1988, the advertising firm Young & Rubicam took over the Army‟s account from 
the Ayer agency.  They continued the “Be All You Can Be” campaign, but supplemented it with 
a new slogan, “Get an Edge on Life.”  The new campaign pushed the idea of Army service as an 
opportunity to learn marketable skills for a post-Army career.  While this theme had always been 
a part of Army advertising, the explicitness of the theme in the Young & Rubicam‟s ads 
beginning in the late 1980s is striking.  Indeed, Army service was not the focus of the ads at all.  
 54 
Rather, the Army was portrayed as merely a means toward a better and more lucrative job 
sometime in the future.  Acknowledging the new emphasis among American youth towards 
upward mobility, Young & Rubicam and the Army stressed how enlisting in the Army could 
help America‟s youth achieve future material success.   
The 1988 ad “Survey” opens with the narrator explaining, “According to a national 
survey, employers are looking for people who can handle heavy responsibilities,” as an Abrams 
tank crests a hill.  The viewer is informed that employers are looking for “people who can 
overcome obstacles,” as three soldiers cross a rope bridge in full combat gear.  Employees who 
can “perform under pressure,” demonstrated by a soldier rappelling down the face of a rock cliff, 
are desired.  Employers want “someone who can work well with others,” just like the team of 
armed soldiers moving into the landing zone of a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter.  The 
advertisement concludes with the narrator stating, “Which is why some of the most successful 
people in the white-collar world, start off green,” as an armed soldier in full combat gear jumps 
from the back of a Bradley IFV and transforms into a stereotypical 1980s businessman, 
brandishing a briefcase and red “power tie.”162  The appeal to young, career-minded potential 
recruits is unmistakable.  Young & Rubicam‟s advertisement, while showing action packed 
depictions of Army life, is attempting to depict temporary Army service as laying the 
groundwork for some future, affluent career.  As America‟s youth were looking toward college 
attendance and civilian employment to get high-paying careers, the Army was presenting itself as 
an alternative means toward that goal.  Instead of capitalizing on an improved public image 
fostered by 1980s mass media, Army advertising by 1988 was appealing to American youths‟ 
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dreams of economic comfort.  Commitment, national service and civic responsibility were not 
featured in the Young & Rubicam “Get an Edge on Life” series of advertisements. 
Another example of Young & Rubicam‟s explicit appeals to youth career aspirations is 
the 1988 advertisement “Take off.”  Opening with UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters landing on a 
hilltop (the same helicopters featured in the “Survey” ad), the narrator states, “If you want to 
land a good job, you have to know what most employers want: like how to motivate yourself; 
how to lead others; how to perform under pressure.”  As he says this, a team of armed soldiers in 
full combat gear move towards the landing Blackhawk, as the team leader shouts “Let‟s go! 
Let‟s go!”  The narrator assures the viewer that “You can learn all these things in the Army.  So 
no matter what career you choose, you‟ll really be ready to „take off,‟” as the team embarks on 
the Blackhawk and depart the landing zone.  The “Be All You Can Be” music plays, as the text 
“Get an Edge on Life” is displayed, followed by a frame with the text “Army.  Be All You Can 
Be.”163   
Young & Rubicam and the USAREC advertising managers, painfully aware of the 
growing preference of American youth for finding the road to success without serving in the 
Army, seemed almost desperate to convey the notion that career success and Army service were 
not mutually exclusive.  As seen in the “Survey” advertisement, the Army seemed to understand 
that it was losing the battle to capture youth interest and was therefore presenting itself as helpful 
route to achieving non-military career success.  The values of Army service itself were not 
presented.  The Army in these ads was merely a stepping stone to another career that offered 
more material comforts and more money. 
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Army advertising‟s golden age of the 1980s presented messages that were similar to 
those of the 1970s.  The advertisements still offered recruits quid pro quo deals.  Promises of 
marketable skill training, educational opportunities and exposure to high-tech equipment merely 
replaced the earlier promises of free housing and concern for a recruit‟s individuality.  As the 
Army continued to strike individual bargains with recruits through its advertising, the media and 
prominent Americans created a mythic image of soldiers that Americans could get behind.  The 
Army focused on the recruitment function of its advertising, while the image-enhancement 
function was taken over by other sources not directly connected to the Army.  The new imagery 
raised the public esteem of soldiers but did little to fill the ranks of the service or to check the 
growing lack of interest toward military service among American youth in the 1980s.   
By invading Kuwait in the late summer of 1990, Saddam Hussein set into motion a series 
of events that would change the messages in U.S. Army advertising in the early 1990s, but only 
for a very limited time.  The American military‟s success in liberating Kuwait in Operation 
Desert Storm cemented the mythic image of the American soldier as a respected, competent and 
valuable member of American society.  Aided by the latest high-tech weapon systems, the 
Army‟s exploits in the Kuwaiti deserts in 1991 were broadcast to a captivated nation on the 24-
hour news network CNN.  The apparent ease of defeating the Iraqi invaders, the low numbers of 
American casualties, and the near-unlimited reach of America‟s high-tech weapons all lent 
themselves to national self-congratulations and a lasting high regard for the Army and its 
soldiers.  The “stain” of Vietnam had seemingly been purged from both the Army and the 
nation‟s conscience by the military success in Kuwait.  The raised esteem for soldiers would 
shape Army television advertising of the early 1990s.  But even as Americans celebrated the 
conclusion of a “good war,” recruitment difficulties, fueled by continued youth disinterest in 
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military service and a booming economy, plagued the Army in the 1990s.  By the end of the 
decade, limited youth interest and a “reduction in force” conducted by the Defense Department 
left a much smaller force than the one that deployed for Operation Desert Storm.    
The military‟s performance in Kuwait demonstrated to the American people that the 
military was a quality force, capable of handling a serious threat to international peace while 
employing only as much force as necessary.  The Gulf War was a limited war with limited 
objectives, led by experienced professionals and manned by true volunteers.  The force that won 
the “100 hours war” on the ground in Kuwait exemplified the image of professional competence 
and compassion that Americans had come to believe characterized their armed forces.  
Americans were united behind their military in a way that had not been experienced since before 
the Vietnam era.  The1980s Hollywood imagery of “the soldier” seemed to have been realized in 
the Gulf War.  The differences between soldiers and the rest of America seemed more 
pronounced after the war.  A Newsweek correspondent noted that the men and women of the 
armed forces “looked like a Norman Rockwell painting come to life.  They were young, 
confident, and hardworking, and they went about their business with poise and élan.”164  
Soldiers, the media in 1991 trumpeted, were more virtuous and happy than the rest of America.
 
 
Historian Victor David Hanson claimed that the armed forces had “somehow distilled from the 
rest of us an elite cohort” that represented values from a bygone and better America.165 
The Gulf War, watched by millions of Americans nightly, was a true media spectacle.
166
  
All Americans had to do was turn on the television to feel like part of history in the making.  
War, a dangerous and dirty affair, was suddenly sanitized and safe to witness for the entire 
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nation.  The destruction of the Iraqi Army was presented to the American public “as an 
entertaining spectacle, a kind of hyperinflated series of video games ideal for home-TV 
consumption.”167  War had become a spectator sport, where the American public could “support” 
and feel connected to the soldiers fighting in Iraq but know that they were not being called upon 
to sacrifice the safety of their living rooms.  “Reinforcing this enthusiasm was the expectation 
that the great majority of Americans could count on being able to enjoy this new type of war 
from a safe distance.”168  Bacevich summed up Americans‟ perspective thusly, “As with their 
favorite professional football team, Americans cheer[ed] the troops on with verve and 
enthusiasm.  Increasingly, however, they [had] about as much in common with real warriors as 
they [did] with the gridiron warriors inhabiting a typical NFL locker room.”169   
Army advertising from the early 1990s capitalized on the renewed public sentimentality 
for the Army and its soldiers, but would do so only for a short time.  The ads immediately after 
the war introduced patriotic imagery and concepts such as commitment and national service, 
which had been absent in Army advertising over the previous twenty years. The advertisement 
“Freedom Isn‟t Free” ran as a paid ad and as a PSA in 1991.  It starts with various images of 
soldiers performing exciting, dangerous feats such as high altitude parachuting and rappelling 
down a rock wall.  Next, a black frame appears with “Courage” written in large white letters.  
More images appear showing an Apache attack helicopter in flight and a female soldier working 
at a high-tech radar scope.  The music is subdued, but with a military drum roll.  “Competence” 
is the next frame that appears on a black background.  Soldiers in desert camouflage are shown 
running in a desert environment (presumably Kuwait) next to a desert-painted Bradley IFV.  
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“Commitment” is the next word featured, followed by the words “Because” and “Freedom Isn‟t 
Free.”  The music then turns into a rock and roll song called “My Hometown.”  For the first time 
ever in an Army commercial, an American flag is featured fluttering in the breeze as Boy Scouts 
salute it.  The songs lyrics “My hometown… is not like this” blare as two soldiers run down a 
sand dune with weapons drawn.  As more running soldiers, tanks and vehicles pass on the 
screen, the song proclaims that it was “alright with me” that the battlefield was not like home, 
“because I‟m out here… for my hometown, because freedom isn‟t free!” as scenes from back 
home (teenagers kissing at a drive in restaurant, veterans running the flag up a pole, a beautiful 
girl of about eleven years old holding her hand over her heart) appear on the screen.
170
  The 
advertisement is a reinforcement of the “good soldier” image popularized in the 1980s and 
verified in the just-completed Gulf War.  The theme is that courageous, competent professionals 
are in a very inhospitable place to allow Americans to lead normal lives in “my hometown.”  
Oddly the advertisement makes no appeal for Americans to join the Army in this vital mission of 
preserving freedom.  The ad appears to be telling the viewer, “Remember that there are 
Americans in harm‟s way tonight, but they can manage America‟s enemies without you.  Enjoy 
your freedom, courtesy of the U.S. Army.”  This ad, then, was aimed at the Army‟s secondary 
goal, public relations enhancement, without addressing the primary goal of personnel 
recruitment. 
The flag waving and feel-good imagery of the 1991 ad campaign were relatively short-
lived.  The target demographic for recruitment remained more interested in attending college and 
landing a high-paying job than paying a price for “freedom that wasn‟t free.”  In “Survey II,” 
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techno music plays as images show soldiers engaged in high-tech and exciting activities (high 
altitude airborne jumps, running in the desert next to a Bradley IFV, laying bridges, running in 
formation, flying helicopters).  Black screens appear that say “Army training develops qualities” 
“9 out of 10 employers look for.”  The last shots show a high-altitude jumper‟s feet hitting the 
ground, but the camera pans up to show him wearing a collared shirt, tie and hard hat, rolled up 
plans under his arm, amid a construction site.
171
  American flags fluttering in the breeze were no 
longer apparent and defending one‟s hometown was no longer a reason to enlist.  USAREC and 
Young & Rubicam had gone back to promoting the Army only as a means to achieve a lucrative 
future career. 
The 1993 advertisement “Résumé” is another example of the return to explicit promises 
to provide recruits with career-enhancing skills.  The ad features fast-paced images of high-tech 
Army equipment (helicopters, radars, and computers) and Army personnel who possess 
marketable skills (computer programmers, doctors, and air traffic controllers).  Black screens ask 
the viewer “So” “What‟s On Your Résumé?”  More images appear, then the black screens 
proclaim “Army Training Develops Qualities” “9 Out of 10 Employers Look For.”  More images 
appear and then, on black screens: “Be” “All” “You” “Can” “Be.”172  Again, as in the late 1980s, 
potential recruits are promised future rewards for short-term service.    
Shortly after forces returned home from Southwest Asia, the Defense Department began 
a widespread personnel reduction.  The era of the large, Cold War-era Army was coming to a 
close.  Operation Desert Storm appeared to have been the Army‟s last big battle.  With the post-
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war reduction in force, the services began to de-emphasize recruiting.  Advertising expenditures 
across the services fell by forty-four percent.
173
  The logic of the decision was undeniable; after 
all, why spend money on recruitment advertising during a time of personnel downsizing?  
However, the decision to de-emphasize recruitment in the early 1990s had lasting harmful 
effects.    
The recruiting environment of the 1990s was not promising for the U.S. Army.  The U.S. 
economy in the 1990s was strong, offering young people decent wages with or without college 
attendance.  In the early 1980s, the Army College Fund promised aspiring college students 
money as a “unique selling point” of Army service.  By the 1990s, ACF had lost its uniqueness, 
as competitors “stepped in to match or exceed the army‟s offer.”174  By 1997, college entrance 
was at an all-time high of sixty-seven percent of America‟s military-eligible youth.175  While 
America‟s young people supported the military, they were not interested in serving while other 
options were open to them.  “In a 1983 survey of high school seniors, 17.5 percent said that they 
„want to serve in the armed forces.‟  By 1994… the percentage dropped to 11.8.  In 1997 that 
number stood at 12.9 percent of high school seniors.”176   
Writing in 1995, Edwin Dorn, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, claimed the falling youth propensity for enlistment in the 1990s had several causes.  
He wrote, “Publicity about downsizing and cutbacks, coupled with sharply reduced television 
advertising, seems to have persuaded the public that we are no longer hiring – or, perhaps, that 
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we are not a secure employer.”177   The previously mentioned RAND Corporation study from 
2003 found that in the 1990s, “the strong economy meant that returns to education were 
relatively high and jobs for inexperienced youths were plentiful, and thus many potential recruits 
had attractive educational and nonmilitary employment options after graduating from high 
school.”178  The study also noted that changing youth attitudes about military service were 
brought about by “Desert Storm, the end of the Cold War, and the downsizing of the military.”179  
The study concluded that a lowering of advertising expenditures by the Defense Department and 
the Service had lessened the Army‟s visibility among the target audience, resulting in growing 
unfamiliarity with the Army among its primary target audience. 
As USAREC and the Defense Department were reconsidering the cost effectiveness of 
military advertising, the Army ads continued to promise career and educational opportunities.  
While such promises dominated the advertising themes of the 1990s, an old theme of “personal 
challenge” was ressurected.  Personal challenge was first noted in the “9 a.m.” ad of the early 
1980s but had not been featured prominently since then and certainly had not been a part of the 
Young & Rubicam ads featuring educational and occupational opportunities.  “Basic Training” 
follows a young recruit through his first months in the Army at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.  
The recruit says he is serving for “Reverand O‟Brien, who always told me to give it my best 
shot;” “for my grandmother,” shown in a wheelchair, “who showed me what real courage is,” 
and “for myself, who found it.”  As the recruit rapels down a wooden tower, with his fellow 
recruits looking on, the words “Meet the Challenge” fill the screen.  The ad also directs recruits 
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to visit the Army‟s new interactive website where they can watch Army videos, learn more about 
the Army, and locate local recruiters.
180
  The theme of personal challenge, sometimes coupled 
with the other traditional promises of occupational and educational opportunities, would be 
developed further and become a prominent feature of the “Army of One” ad campaign 
introduced in 2001. 
Ads promising to help pay for college were still used in the 1990s.  In “Uncle Sam 40K,” 
the narrator begins by saying, “If your parents can‟t afford $40,000 for college…” as a young 
woman listens intently and nods, and continues, “Ask your uncle!” as the classic Uncle Sam 
recruiting poster appears to the tune of “Yankee Doodle.”  The narrator expains that the 
Montgomery G.I. Bill and the Army College Fund  could offer a new recruit up to $40,000 for 
higher education and encourages young people to call a recruiter.
181
  The short commercial 
makes a straightforward pitch: contact the Army if you need funds for college, because it might 
be the only way for you to attend school. 
A more interesting commercial, “Uniform,” begins with a soldier putting on his dress 
green uniform as an American flag waves in the background.  “To most people, this is just a 
uniform,” the narration says, “but to me, it‟s something more.  Every time I put it on, it makes 
me feel better and stronger than I was yesterday.  When I‟m in this uniform, I know no limits.  
You gotta see the pride in my mom‟s eyes, or the way my friends look up to me.  But none of 
that matches the satisfaction I feel inside.  That‟s the pride of being a soldier in the U.S. Army!”  
The camera pans back to reveal the fully dressed soldier, an elite Army Ranger.  Confetti rains 
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down on the ranger as he stands next to the Army and American flags.  The music then turns into 
a guitar-driven rock and roll tune, and the images change to footage of an airborne drop while 
other sharply dressed soldiers appear.  The narrator promises “new incentives,” including the 
$40,000 offer for college, an offer to repay student loans up to $65,000 and enlistment bonuses 
up to $12,000.  The narration ends after an invitation to find out how the Army can “bring out 
the best that‟s inside you.”182  The commercial is an interesting mix of traditional Army 
bargaining, the new style of “personal challenge” Army advertising and, with references to the 
pride the soldier‟s mother felt and how his friends looked up to him, a reminder of the public‟s 
high esteem for soldiers.  All in all, this commercial is a frenetic effort to “cover all the bases” of 
Army messages.  The dismay among the advertisers, the Defense Department and the Army 
about growing youth disinterest in enlistment and growing questions about the effectiveness of 
Army advertising seemed to have forced Young & Rubicam to create a commercial that targeted 
America‟s youth with no single, discernable focus.  
A 2003 RAND study pointed out that the media had evolved in the era of the AVF.  
Since 1971, the Army had favored television as the medium of choice.  In 1997, the Army spent 
just over 60% of its total advertising budget on that medium.
183
  However, most Americans‟ 
viewing habits had changed, and television no longer consisted of three major networks.  The 
study noted that “as new participants have entered the market, traditional media outlets have 
become less attractive advertising options.  Most apparent is the decline and fragmentation of 
television audiences.  Primetime viewing of the three major networks, which used to represent 90 
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percent of all viewers, has fallen to below 70 percent.”184  DoD and USAREC began to question 
whether television was losing its effectiveness in reaching young Americans and the public.   
From the 1970s through the early 1990s, the Army had promised career success in 
exchange for a few years of military service.  By the prosperous mid-1990s, however, the 
question arose of why a young person would need Army experience when educational and 
employment opportunities were already abundant.  A 1997 survey revealed American youth 
believed that civilian employment offered more important benefits and incentives than military 
service.
185
  Doubts about the Army‟s dated “Be All You Can Be” campaign began to surface 
among the Army‟s senior leaders and within USAREC.   
In March 1999, Secretary of Defense William Cohen ordered a review of all Defense 
Department advertising and public relations programs.  The Eskew-Murphy study interviewed 
Defense officials, met with ad agencies, and held “focus group meetings” with recruiters, 
potential recruits and recent recruits.
186
  The study concluded that the “largest recruiter of youth 
[Defense Department] does not adequately understand its target.”187  Since 1975, the Department 
of Defense had relied on the annual Youth Attitudinal Tracking Survey (YATS) to produce 
advertising with youth appeal.  The Eskew-Murphy study revealed various flaws in the YATS 
methodology, leading to doubts about the relevance of its results.  YATS was discontinued in 
1999, and the Defense Department turned instead to commissioned studies about youth attitudes.  
The Army recruitment numbers from 1998 and 1999 brought some urgency to the matter: the 
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1998 recruiting shortfall was 801, while the 1999 shortage was a substantial 6,290.
188
  USAREC 
and the Defense Department recognized that the recruiting environment had changed and they 
needed to act quickly in order to reverse the trends. 
The Army‟s answer to its recruiting challenges of the late 1990s was a new focus for its 
advertising campaign and  a “repositioning of its recruiting force to reconnect America with its 
army,” that is, new messages and new media.189  The changing focus and methods of Army 
advertising in the late 1990s helped to achieve a surplus of 113 soldiers over the recruitment goal 
of 80,000 for FY2000.
190
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CHAPTER 7 - The New Millennium: Struggling to Make the 
Numbers 
Through the 1990s, USAREC struggled to understand the changing recruiting 
environment characterized by declining interest in military service, record-level college 
attendance and a robust economy.  The Army‟s 1998 and 1999 recruitment goals were not met.   
Changes were needed in order to remind the target audiences that the Army was still hiring.  The 
Army altered not only its advertising message but also its advertising means to combat declining 
enlistments.  The most important new method to connect to young people was the Internet.  By 
1999, the Army had created “an advertising blitz in markets of opportunity using new channels, 
such as direct Internet mailings and Internet cyber-recruiter chat rooms, to help it compete with 
the education and industrial sectors.”  At the same time, the Army expanded recruitment 
activities on college campuses to capture the college dropout market, classified as “high-grads.191  
While public image did not appear to be a problem for the Army around 2000, recruitment 
shortfalls had to be addressed in short order.  The Army and its new advertising agency, the Leo 
Burnett Agency, believed changes to the Army‟s overall campaign and its advertising messages 
would help the service meet its recruiting challenges.  
Army advertising content headed in a new direction as it bid farewell to the “Be All You 
Can Be” campaign.  In 2000, a new Army advertising campaign was revealed just as new 
national security threats were emerging.  In 2000, the U.S. Army and the Burnett agency 
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unveiled an ad campaign designed to engage young Americans in a new way.  The Burnett 
agency and the advertising managers at USAREC had researched youth-oriented themes and 
concluded that an individualistic approach would be the best one to use.  The “Army of One” 
campaign had a “hip,” contemporary feel.  While job skills and educational opportunities were 
still featured, the central message was the Army‟s promise to respect one‟s individuality upon 
entering the service.  Just as in the 1970s ads, the Army was telling youths that it wanted them 
for their individual talents and would not rob them of their identities.   
Criticisms of the individualism promoted in the ads appeared quickly inside the Army‟s 
ranks.  Recruits joining an “Army of One,” the critics reasoned, would not fit into the force that 
valued teamwork and selfless service.  The ad campaign had a distinctively different tone from 
the opportunity-based ads of the 1980s and attempted to attract the next generation of recruits 
with promises of individual glory.
192
  Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera justified the new 
direction of Army advertising, saying that it did not matter if the slogan‟s focus on the individual 
obscured the “no-I-in-team” nature of Army life as long as young people enlisted.  Once they 
werein the ranks, the Army could train them for teamwork.
193
   
Beginning in 2001, Army television commercials directed young people to check up on 
the lives of new Army recruits in a web series featured on www.goarmy.com.  Similar to reality 
television, the web episodes introduced real recruits and followed them through Basic Training.  
Through the commercials and web episodes, viewers could trace the new recruits‟ transformation 
from civilians (not so different from the viewers) into soldiers.   The viewer met the new soldiers 
as they departed the reception station for their Basic Training course.  In “Shipping Out,” 
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viewers were put in the new recruits‟ place.  The narrator, speaking as the viewer‟s “inner 
dialogue,” notes that their preconceptions about what “Basic” would be like have been proven 
wrong and that they are ready to make the transition from civilian to soldier.  The viewer is 
introduced to the individual soldiers by their first names; “Ben, 23,” “Richard, 19,” “Jermaine, 
19,” “Ever, 19,” and “Michelle, 21.”  As they are introduced, the close shots of their faces let the 
viewer identify with them individually.  Just when it appears that “Basic” might not be as bad as 
they believed, drill sergeants appear on the scene, shouting at the new recruits and exposing both 
recruits and viewers to the gritty “reality” of Basic Training.194  This is the Basic Training that 
viewers had seen in countless movies such as Stripes, An Officer and a Gentleman, and Full 
Metal Jacket.    
The ads follow the recruits over the twelve-week course.  Through the rest of the series, 
the viewer sees the major weekly training events typical of Basic Training.  The viewer 
vicariously experiences the challenges and triumphs of the recruits: “Richard, 19” is terrified of 
heights but faces and conquers his fear while scaling “Victory Tower” during Week 2;195 
“Michelle, 21” is nervous about firing her M-16 semi-automatic rifle in Week 4, but tells the 
viewer how her training has allowed her to face the challenge;
196
 in Week 5, “Jermaine, 19” 
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gains an appreciation for the teamwork required for his squad to negotiate an obstacle course.
197
  
Potential recruits caught glimpses of the challenges that awaited them at Basic Training if they 
enlisted.  Additionally, the ads promote a familiarity between the audience and the new recruits, 
ordinary kids, presumably just like those in the target audience.  Through the new recruits‟ trials, 
tribulations and triumphs, the viewer is assured that if he takes on the challenge of Army Basic 
Training, then he too is likely to succeed and graduate, just as “Ever,” “Jermaine,” and 
“Michelle” do in the final episode, “Graduation.”  The diverse individuals introduced in the first 
episode emerge from Basic Training as well-trained, fit soldiers who are still individually 
recognizable to the viewer.  The message is clear: through all of the stress, fear and challenges, 
the recruits made it while maintaining their individual identities. 
Television commercials promoting the website www.goarmy.com continued in 2003-
2004 with the “2400/7 series” of advertisements.  Similar to the “Basic Training series,” 2400/7 
focused on the “8 True Stories” of “8 Real Soldiers” serving in the Army.198  With blaring guitar 
music and quick, jerky cinematography, the commercials resemble music videos.  The images 
depict exciting Army activities such as jumping from airplanes, flying helicopters and working 
on the side of a volcano.  The soldiers featured in the ads introduce themselves to the viewer, and 
their faces are clearly shown.  Again, as with the Basic Training ads, the viewer is meant to 
identify with the individual soldiers.   As the soldiers tell their stories in the series, the viewer 
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learns that while each had gained valuable skills and did exciting things, their personal identities 
were never at risk in the “Army of One.” 
The advertisement “Legions” best typifies the individualistic character of the “Army of 
One” campaign.  A soldier on a hillside speaks through the narrator: “I am a soldier… an Army 
of One.”  The soldier‟s comrades are barely visible in the background behind him.  The 
voiceover continues, “Even though I am part of the strongest army in the world, I am my own 
force – with the latest technology, training and support, who I am has become better than who I 
was.  And I‟ll be the first to tell you, the might of the U.S. Army doesn‟t lie in numbers, it lies in 
soldiers like me, Specialist Mark Decarli.[sic]  I am an Army of One.”  He concludes with a 
reference to the website: “and you can see my strength,” with the www.goarmy.com link 
appearing onscreen.
199
  Throughout the ad, the young soldier‟s face is shown in close-ups and he 
emerges as a distinct, competent individual who has found his strength while serving in the 
Army.  The Army hoped young viewers would be able to identify with him and see themselves 
serving in the young specialist‟s place. 
Additionally, the “Army of One” ads introduced something new to Army advertising: an 
easily identifiable logo.  A gold-bordered black box with a white star over a smaller black box 
with “U.S. Army” in white letters joined the golden arches, the Nike swoosh and the sweeping 
script on Coca-Cola bottles, as product identifiers.  The Leo Burnett Agency, using accepted 
advertising techniques, had taken one more step toward turning the U.S. Army into an easily 
identifiable product for sale. 
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After the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and in New York City on September 11, 2001, 
the Army‟s promises of educational opportunities and marketable skills for recruits somehow 
seemed out of place.  U.S. Army Accessions Command (USAAC), USAREC and the Burnett 
agency decided to take the “Army of One” campaign in a new direction that would capitalize on 
America‟s outrage over the attacks while simultaneously reinforcing the positive public image of 
soldiers.  In an effort to comfort a shaken nation, the ads portrayed the soldier as someone who 
would set things right.  At the same time, American youth received a call to arms to defend the 
homeland and to make the terrorists pay.   
After the September 11
th
 attacks, a new “rally around the flag” sentiment possessed the 
country, especially among young people.  As David King and Zachary Karabell asserted in The 
Generation of Trust, the post-9/11 patriotism was partly driven by a new generation of 
Americans, largely from Generation X (born from 1962 through 1975) and especially among 
Millennials (born after 1975).  King and Karabell contended that young people trusted the 
government, and especially the military, more deeply than their baby boomer parents ever had.
200
  
They noted that “a whopping 93 percent of college undergraduates [claimed] to be patriotic 
Americans, with „very patriotic‟ the largest response category at 49 percent.”201  King and 
Karabell credited the positive mass media imagery of the military throughout the 1980s and 
1990s as key to the youthful support after 9/11.  However, King and Karabell described an 
important paradox in youth attitudes: despite their professed patriotism, only fifteen percent of 
those young Americans polled planned to enlist to fight terrorism.
202
  The Army met its 
recruitment goals from 2000 until 2004, but the numbers were never overwhelming.  In FY2002, 
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the first after the terrorist attacks, the Army exceeded its recruitment goal by 604 recruits, the 
largest surplus between 1999 and 2005.
203
  While youth support for the military might have been 
strong, even in the aftermath of 9/11, youth interest in enlisting remained low.  
After 9/11, an initial postponement of commercial films with overwhelming violence 
“gave way to a trend toward films involving war and espionage with positive portrayals of the 
men and women responsible for defending the country.  Black Hawk Down and Windtalkers 
portrayed the heroism of soldiers past and present.”204  The Defense Department cooperated with 
Hollywood studios to create positive portrayals of American soldiers, casting them as able 
defenders of the American way of life.  Hollywood movies began to link virtues between the 
soldiers of the past, especially from World War II, with the soldiers of the new millennium.  
Productions such as Saving Private Ryan and HBO‟s miniseries Band of Brothers indicated that 
the post-9/11 Army was guided by the same courage and compassion as that of the “greatest 
generation” of soldiers.  As Bacevich noted, the Hollywood depictions created “an apparently 
seamless historical narrative of American soldiers as liberators, with Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
March 2003 becoming a sequel to Operation Overlord in June 1944.”205  The Global War on 
Terror (GWOT) was explicitly linked to World War II in both Hollywood productions and Army 
television commercials.  The Burnett Agency included World War II imagery in its 
advertisements to create an explicit link between the “good” and “necessary” war fought by the 
“greatest generation” and modern soldiers serving in the GWOT.  American political leaders 
made comparisons between Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein when U.S. attention turned to the 
perceived threat from Iraq.  As Hollywood and politicians reassured the public that the mission 
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and soldiers of the present were as worthy as those of the past, the Defense Department became 
increasingly willing to assist the filmmakers in managing the military‟s image.  Just as in the 
1980s, Hollywood depictions of brave soldiers, past and present, helped advance one of the goals 
of Army television advertising, the projection of a positive public image for the service, while 
doing little to promote enlistment.
206
   
The Burnett agency‟s post-Iraqi invasion television ads featured unprecedented scenes of 
combat from Iraq.  Army television advertising, from its earliest days, had scrupulously avoided 
depictions of combat.  They had feared that explicit acknowledgement of combat would scare off 
recruits and lessen parental support.  But beginning in 2003, the “Army of One” ads highlighted 
the shortness of the war and the fall of Baghdad.  The ads proclaimed U.S. success in the 
GWOT; one needed only to look as far as Baghdad to conclude that American soldiers were 
unbeatable.   The ads called on young Americans to join the winning team while reassuring the 
rest of America that the troops were liberating the people of Iraq.  The Iraq War of 2003 was thus 
a worthy sequel to the “good wars” of America‟s past. 
The Leo Burnett ad “Generations – Iraq” depicts the invasion of Iraq as a benevolent 
service for the Iraqi people.  American soldiers in the ad appear well-intentioned and helpful 
towards the Iraqis.  The music is a single piano playing a sentimental tune as soldiers in desert 
combat gear, apparently on the road to Baghdad, flash on the screen.  Smiling Iraqi civilians 
surround smiling American soldiers.  A black screen with gold text follows, stating “Every 
generation has its heroes.”  A column of desert-camouflaged Bradley IFVs is shown, followed by 
another screen of text that assures the viewer, “This one is no different.” Another smiling 
American soldier shakes hands with an Iraqi girl as other Iraqi children look on, smiling with 
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approval.
207
  The message is that American troops in Iraq are carrying on the just cause of 
liberation that has been inherited from World War II.  Americans, the ad suggests, should feel 
good about the effort in Iraq and about the men and women performing it.  No direct appeal to 
enlist is made, but the implication is that enlisting can enable one to participate as part of the 
noble effort.   
As long as the invasion of Iraq went well with relatively few American casualties and 
Hussein successfully driven from power, recruiting efforts benefitted.  Recruiting in FY2004 
exceeded the 77,000 target figure by more than five hundred new recruits.
208
  Once the 
insurgency in Iraq picked up momentum, however, enlistments fell.  As the popularity of the war 
in Iraq plummeted among the American public, recruiting became increasingly difficult.  Near 
the height of public dissatisfaction with the Iraq War in 2005, the Army fell short of its 
recruitment goal by 6,627 new soldiers.
209
  Army recruitment advertising needed another 
remake.    
Despite their continued support for the troops, Americans had grown disillusioned with 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan by 2005.  College and civilian employment remained viable 
alternatives to military service without the risk injury or death.  Youth propensity to join the 
military was at an all-time low during the first decade of the 21
st
 century.   
Criticisms of the “Army of One” campaign within the Army‟s ranks proved to be too 
much for it to continue.  The campaign was unpopular with many soldiers and leaders within the 
Army who believed that it pandered to youth culture and that it denied the importance of 
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teamwork and selfless service in Army life.  The Army‟s relationship with the Leo Burnett 
agency was a tumultuous one with both sides claiming that the other disregarded their points of 
view, resulting in ads with which no one was happy.  U.S. Army Accessions Command 
complained to senior Leo Burnett officials that the account and production management team 
handling the “Army of One” account were “resistant to accept [Army] input and are reluctant to 
accept or use learning from research [to shape advertising]…which results in less productive 
creative review sessions.”210   
The Army opened bidding for an all-new ad campaign that would encourage youth 
interest in the military while allowing for a harmonious relationship between the Army and a 
new advertising agency.  The new ad agency, McCann Worldgroup, worked with the Army‟s 
advertising and media personnel to analyze the challenges of the rapidly changing recruiting 
environment.  The Army was looking for McCann to deliver a new message that would 
specifically convey the unique qualities of the U.S. Army.  The resulting campaign was “Army 
Strong,” unveiled in November 2006.  It initially appeared as though the “Army Strong” 
campaign would strike the balance between promoting the material benefits of enlistment and 
highlighting the values that shaped the service.  Eventually, however, the “Army Strong” 
commercials reverted to the traditional “Be All You Can Be”-style promises of job skills training 
and educational opportunities.  Despite the promising start to the ad campaign in 2006, “Army 
Strong” resorted to bargaining with young Americans. 
The first decade of the new millennium was characterized by a difficult recruiting 
environment for the Army.  Record college attendance and a strong economy had reduced the 
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appeal of an Army career for many young people, despite the high public esteem for the service.  
Recruiting prospects dimmed even further as post-9/11 outrage cooled and the insurgency in Iraq 
gained strength.  Army television ads of the time tried a fresh approach, one aimed at 
humanizing soldiers and assuring young Americans that their individuality would not be 
threatened once they enlisted.  However, disapproval of the campaign‟s message within the 
ranks, a struggling recruiting effort in wartime and a tumultuous working relationship between 
the Army and the Leo Burnett Agency ensured that the distinctive “Army of One” campaign was 
scrapped. 
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CHAPTER 8 - Conclusion 
The draft enabled the Army to fill its ranks without regard to how the public perceived it 
as an institution.  However, in the 1960s, potential recruits and the general public became 
overwhelmed with negative views of the Army because of the war in Vietnam.   Because it had 
not previously needed one, the Army had no ready-made method to counter the decline of its 
public image.  The Army did little to revamp its image among the public or potential recruits, but 
continued to rely on conscription to fill the ranks.     
Richard Nixon‟s campaign promise to end the draft forced the Army‟s leadership to 
consider the impact of its poor image.  Suddenly, the question of how to encourage enlistments 
and repair the Army‟s public image became paramount.   With the end of the draft looming, 
Army leaders and advertisers employed ingenuity and initiative in creating a new imagery and 
messages to achieve both of those vital aims.  Employing market research, the Army settled on 
paid broadcast advertising to deliver its messages to a large audience.  Television, with its ability 
to reach both of the Army‟s “target audiences” (potential recruits and the general public), 
became the centerpiece of the Army‟s promotional efforts.    
The Army‟s adoption of paid television advertising was revolutionary, while the content 
of its messages and imagery changed the conception of military service among America‟s youth.  
For young people, the Army became only one job opportunity among others.  Additionally, the 
content of Army television commercials for the first thirty-five years of the AVF did little to 
change the overall public‟s views of the Army as an institution; Hollywood and prominent public 
figures did more to improve public esteem for the Army.  The Army‟s dual purposes for its 
advertising were never fully realized.  While the Army increasingly focused its advertising 
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efforts on recruiting quality volunteers, image enhancement was largely left to Hollywood 
producers, news commentators and politicians to handle.   
Army commercials from 1971 to 2005 focused on different particulars, but common 
themes ran throughout.  In the commercials of the era, Army television advertisements presented 
the service as willing to strike bargains with individuals.  As first envisioned by the N. W. Ayer 
advertising agency in 1971, Army ads continually presented enlistment as an exchange between 
equal parties.  From the Ayers agency ads of the 1970s through the “Be All You Can Be” ads of 
the 1980s to the Burnett agency “Army of One” ads in the new millennium, young people were 
encouraged to think that the Army wanted to make contracts with them as individuals.  The 
advertisements promised the means to achieve their educational and occupational goals.  Army 
service itself was rarely ever the central feature of advertising from 1971 to 2005; rather it was 
the quid pro quo exchange between the Army and the individual.  While the production values, 
sophistication and cost of Army commercials grew between 1971 and 2005, the fundamental 
message that the Army was looking to hire short-term help in exchange for material benefits 
remained constant.   
As noted by Charles Moskos, when young people were exposed to the message of the 
Army‟s television ads, military service took on the appearance of an ordinary occupation, a 
commodity to be traded for in a marketplace.  The Army never used calls for public service or 
reminders of civic duty in its advertising for any length of time.  By presenting their message this 
way, the Army and its advertising agencies reminded potential recruits that they had a choice not 
to serve.  Casting the Army as just another job offer left the service‟s recruitment effort 
vulnerable to the vagaries of the labor market.  Recruitment numbers went up or down according 
to the availability of jobs and financing for higher education.  In its first and most important 
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objective in advertising, recruitment, the Army ceded the initiative to the volatilities of the labor 
market. 
In the second objective of Army advertising, the promotion of a positive public image, 
again the Army abandoned the initiative.  Army advertising from 1971 to 2005 did little to build 
the Army‟s image in the public mind.  The commercials focused almost exclusively on quid pro 
quo bargaining and did little to promote the values and principles that guide the Army as an 
institution.  Rather, the Army allowed politicians, public figures and the mass media to define its 
public image.  Concepts of civic obligation and the transcendence of self-interests were more 
readily found in movies and television shows such as Saving Private Ryan and Band of Brothers 
than in Army ads.  The end result was the perpetuation of a fictitious image that increased public 
support for the Army but provided no recruitment benefit for the service or check against the 
growing disinterest of American youth in actually enlisting.   
Alternative advertising messages, ones that promoted the Army as a values-based 
institution first and foremost and that highlighted its commitment to a higher purpose, might 
have effectively achieved the intended recruitment and image-enhancement purposes.  Compared 
to the Army, U.S. Marine Corps television ads in the AVF era provided a much different 
message.  Marine advertising stressed the importance of noble virtues and the value of people 
who never fail to defend those virtues.  The Marine television commercials spoke of honor, 
courage, commitment, and pride.  The messages emphasize that there will always be a need for 
people who can live up to these values.
211
  Marine advertising powerfully portrayed the USMC 
as an elite force dedicated to something beyond the individual interests of those who served in it.  
The Marine Corps television commercials achieved what the Army had intended for its 
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advertising to do all along: enhancement of enlistments while simultaneously bolstering public 
image.  The 2003 National Research Council study found that “[o]nly advertising for the 
Marines consistently addresses the noble virtues that can be associated with military service.  
The capability of Marine advertising to generate interest in military service is reflected in the 
comment of an Army recruiter who was interviewed as part of this project.  The recruiter spoke 
of the impact of Marine advertising on the youth he approached and stated that his recruiting 
problems might be lessened if the Defense Department invested more resources in advertising 
for the Marines.”212   
If the Army advertising had crafted similar messages from 1971 to 2005, its recruiting 
and public image management efforts might have been more successful. 
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